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ON TRUST: THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AS FIDUCIARY

DEVIKA HOVELL*
ABSTRACT
Perceived failures by the U.N. Security Council have been characterized as “betrayals of trust,” which threaten to impact the strength
of the Council’s authority. In certain legal cultures, fiduciary law has
been recognized as an effective legal mechanism to underwrite trust
in the exercise of authority. This Article considers the potential value
in applying the fiduciary construct to the Security Council setting as
a way to consolidate trust. In doing so, it is necessary to unpack two
different conceptions of the fiduciary construct: the precept of law
(derived from domestic private law) and the precept of authority
(sometimes described as public fiduciary theory). Interpreting the
former precept as applicable to private interests and the latter to the
public interest, this Article recognizes both precepts as applicable to
relationships in which there is a legal expectation that those exercising control over another’s interests will not exploit (duty of loyalty)
or squander (duty of care) those interests. The central question is
whether the U.N. Security Council can be said to exist in such a
relationship, either with private individuals or entities or with some
iteration of the international community more broadly. By reference
to recent controversies, including privatization of public assets in
Kosovo, sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, Security
Council vetoes in the face of atrocity and due process failures in
sanctions decision-making, this Article examines the extent to which
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Dominik Zaum for their thoughtful advice and comments on earlier drafts. My grateful
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the fiduciary construct can play a useful role in reinforcing trust in
the Security Council setting.
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INTRODUCTION
Power and trust can be an unholy alliance. Trust itself does
nothing to control power and can, if misplaced, facilitate power’s
exploitation. Certain legal systems have created the construct of the
fiduciary as a way to regulate particular relationships “in which one
party ... [exercises] discretionary power over the significant practical
interests of another.”1 To the extent the fiduciary construct has been
described as a principle of trust, trust is used here as a metaphor for
a legal expectation that those exercising control over another’s
interests will not exploit or squander those interests. Considered in
this way, fiduciary law has more to do with distrust than trust, with
law offering itself as a surety in situations in which mere trust has
the potential to corrupt.
The U.N. Security Council is a context in which trust alone has
proved no match for power. The drafters of the U.N. Charter vested
the Council with vast discretionary power in the expectation it
would take its place among the harbingers of international peace
and security and contribute to the “salvation of mankind.”2 This
trust has not always been rewarded. Certain recent missteps by the
Council have been characterised as a “betrayal of trust,” including
(1) the exercise of veto power to prevent measures to address
atrocity crimes in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Syria, among other
conflicts;3 (2) sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers;4

1. Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011)
(emphasis omitted).
2. NAGENDRA SINGH, TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
at vii (1958); Jan Klabbers, The Life and Times of the Law of International Organizations, 70
NORDIC J. INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 287, 288 (2001).
3. Rep. of the Indep. Inquiry into the Actions of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda, transmitted by Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the U.N. Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257, at 3, 45 (Dec. 16, 1999); see U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica,
¶¶ 5, 503, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999).
4. Rep. of an Indep. Rev. on Sexual Exploitation & Abuse by Int’l Peacekeeping Forces
in the Cent. Afr. Rep., transmitted by the U.N. Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution
70/186 (2016) Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers, U.N. Doc.
A/71/99, at 2, 4, 61 (June 23, 2016), https://www.undocs.org/A/71/99 [https://perma.cc/3X4VQMJG].
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(3) responsibility for severe cholera outbreak in Haiti;5 and (4) due
process failures in imposing sanctions on individuals.6 The loss of
trust is pertinent. The Council relies upon collaboration and
compliance by state and non-state actors to fulfill its mandate,7 a
mandate increasingly described in terms of governance. “Sociologists who have studied the phenomenon of ‘social capital’ have
argued that trust is a condition of effective govern[ance],”8 enabling
cooperation and collaboration in the achievement of valuable goals.9
As Kristina Daugirdas has described in her detailed work on the
reputation of international organizations, “when an international
organization’s reputation ... suffers,” stakeholders will be “less
willing to support the organization financially and otherwise, less
willing to follow its recommendations, or more reluctant to turn to
the organization to address new problems.”10
This Article considers the potential value in applying the fiduciary construct in the Security Council setting as a way to consolidate trust. The legal basis for this extension of the principle is not
obvious. The origin of fiduciary law is in the private law of equity
developed as part of the common law.11 However, by mapping the
development of the fiduciary concept in common law jurisdictions,
the legal logic in its extension to the Security Council setting
becomes more evident. Development of the fiduciary relationship
can be tracked through a number of shifts, from an ad hoc to a generalizable concept of private law; from private law to the context of
5. See Deborah Sontag, In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/world/americas/haitis-cholera-outracedthe-experts-and-tainted-the-un.html [https://perma.cc/U24Y-PNSB].
6. Per Cramér, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: The Erosion
of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 85,
98 (Erika de Wet et al. eds., 2003).
7. See Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System
of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should Be Apportioned for Violations of Human
Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 113, 120 (2010); Mac Darrow & Louise Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights
in the Development Operations of the United Nations, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 446, 461 (2009).
8. Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity, Accountability, and Trust: Tensions at the Heart of the
Rule of Law 9 (Feb. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3126397 [https://perma.cc/EDZ4-AEZX].
9. See Matthew Harding, Manifesting Trust, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 262 (2009).
10. Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation as a Disciplinarian of International Organizations,
113 AM. J. INT’L L. 221, 232 (2019).
11. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 818 (1983).

2021]

ON TRUST: THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AS FIDUCIARY

1235

public governance and from public governance to international governance. This Article necessarily builds on the work of scholars who
have navigated these shifts. My aim is to engage critically with this
literature and consider whether it is appropriate to carry the concept into the distinctive setting of the Security Council.
For certain scholars who view fiduciary law as a “meta concept”
potentially applicable to relationships with a transnational or global
scope, the proposition will not be controversial.12 However, many
other scholars consider the fiduciary construct to have already been
stretched too far beyond its intended remit and “should not be the
growing area that it is sometimes alleged to be.”13 It could be that
the loose association of the term “fiduciary” with “trust” has bred a
temptation to import the label into new contexts without adequate
attention to the principle’s roots or parameters. Indeed, it is arguable that the use of the term fiduciary should sometimes be seen as
more legal metaphor than legal principle, with implications for the
legitimacy of legal authority instead of legal liability.14 The problem
is a failure, on occasion, to distinguish between these two different
usages of fiduciary, that is, fiduciary as legal principle and fiduciary
as a principle of authority.
In this Article, the first step is to distinguish between these two
manifestations of the fiduciary construct. The second step is then to
determine whether either fiduciary construct applies or should
apply in the U.N. Security Council setting. Of course, “[l]aw is a
source-based enterprise.”15 In considering the application of
fiduciary law to the U.N. Security Council, it is clearly not enough
12. See Seth Davis & Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 U.C.
IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMPAR. L. 1, 3 (2020); see also Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary
Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 921, 933 (2011); cf. Frankel, supra note 11, at 798.
13. Sarah Worthington, Fiduciaries: When Is Self-Denial Obligatory?, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
500, 508 (1999). Scholars have described the propagation of the fiduciary principle as an
invasion, developing into a “habit of throwing fiduciary language at any moral outrage,” Peter
Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 5 n.5 (2000), to the extent
fiduciary law has become “a back-door route to law reform of private law obligations and
public law protections.” Worthington, supra, at 507; see also Laura Hoyano, The Flight to the
Fiduciary Haven, in PRIVACY AND LOYALTY 169, 169 (Peter Birks ed., 1997) (discussing “the
territory the fiduciary concept recently has invaded”).
14. Paul Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, 38 FED. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 335, 336,
339 (2010).
15. Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2435-36 (2017).
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to point to the existence of such principles in the private law of the
United States, or the United Kingdom, or Japan, or India, or even
to a modest collection of jurisdictions16 in which fiduciary or
fiduciary-like principles have been found to exist.17 The focus of this
Article is on the position under international law, a context in which
positivism “remains the lingua franca.”18 Our first port of call is
accordingly to the pedigree sources of international law listed in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
namely treaties, customary international law and general principles
of law.19 An additional challenge, if such obligations are found to
exist under international law, will be to establish that these
principles apply to the U.N. Security Council. As will be shown, the
heterogeneity of principles of fiduciary law across legal systems
coupled with the broad discretion granted to the Council under the
Charter renders the exercise of identifying positive principles of
fiduciary law applicable to the Security Council complicated.20
Nevertheless, while a positivist analysis may be the beginning, it
should not be the end of the inquiry. Considering the political
16. See generally Part III Fiduciary Law Across History and Legal Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (providing an
overview of fiduciary principles in various classical and contemporary jurisdictions).
17. The domestic law route should not be entirely discounted without comment. While the
option of domestic enforcement of fiduciary duties against the Council is unlikely given the
U.N.’s absolute immunity from domestic law processes, it is not impossible. See Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. II, § 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 16 U.N.T.S.
4. The future limitation of U.N. immunity in contemporary circumstances of international
governance is something that has been raised in academic commentary and that continues
to be tested (albeit unsuccessfully) in domestic courts. See, e.g., Georges v. United Nations,
834 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’g 84 F. Supp. 3d 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Kristen E. Boon,
The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341,
363 (2016); Rosa Freedman, UN Immunity or Impunity? A Human Rights Based Challenge,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 239, 241 (2014). There is also the prospect of the U.N. waiving immunity
or of the U.N. creating a body that operates outside the U.N. context and without the
protection of its immunity; on this latter possibility, see Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking
to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International Administration’s Open-Ended
Mandate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 637, 652 (2005). In these circumstances, the issue of the
application of fiduciary law will be a matter for the particular domestic legal system in which
any claim is raised.
18. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International
Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 293 (1999).
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/
statute [https://perma.cc/RU2F-STZN].
20. See infra Part I; infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
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setting within which it operates, the Security Council is concerned
not merely with the legality but also with the legitimacy of its
authority.21 To ignore legitimacy in analysing the role of law in the
U.N. context is, as the expression goes, to leave Hamlet out of the
play. Adherence to fiduciary law may be justified by factors other
than a legal requirement to adhere to it. In positivist terms, there
are very few legal restrictions on the Council, yet this has come with
negative consequences in terms of wider perceptions of the Council’s
legitimacy.22 Recent controversies have led to a “crisis of legitimacy”
in U.N. decision-making.23 In the absence of objective standards by
which the conduct of international officials can be assessed, or
against which Council officials and agents can be held accountable
when they are perceived to have fallen short, the Council is deprived
of the vital function of law as a legitimating mechanism facilitative
of its overall authority.24
The discussion of the fiduciary principle in both the domestic and
international context will accordingly be dual pronged. Parts I and
II seek to understand and outline the fiduciary construct for the
benefit of international lawyers, both as a precept of law and as a
precept of authority. In Part III, I consider the potential for the
fiduciary construct to be recognized as an international precept,
either in narrow terms as a legal principle or in broader terms as a
principle of authority. In Part IV, I seek to apply the principles to a
number of case studies as a means to determine whether fiduciary
law and theory has any role to play in the Security Council setting.
I. THE FIDUCIARY CONSTRUCT AS A PRECEPT OF LAW
For international lawyers, as will be explained, one purpose of
understanding domestic fiduciary law is to ascertain whether it can
serve as the source of a general principle of international law. For
much of its history, fiduciary law was not regarded as a field of law
21. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
23. Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the U.N. Collective Security System?, 56
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 157, 157, 169-70 (2007).
24. More broadly on this theme of the advantages of legal limitations on political
authority, see generally STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).
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in its own right, but rather “the various types of fiduciaries [were]
studied in the context of ... specific substantive areas of law.”25
Tamar Frankel’s work was pivotal in identifying fiduciary law as a
“discrete category ... properly separate from contract, tort, [trust,]
and the other departments of private law.”26 However, the idea of
fiduciary law as a generalizable category is not without problems.27
The heterogeneity of fiduciary principles is revealed not only across
various kinds of fiduciary relationships but also across jurisdictions.28
This indicates that the idea of identifying “general principles” of
fiduciary law may be naïve. Nevertheless, there is clearly something
distinctive about the fiduciary construct, and salient resemblances
between established categories of fiduciary relationship are
discernible.29 In the Section that follows, I examine whether it is
possible to identify the nature of the relationship, protected
interests, and obligations that together contribute to a set of general
fiduciary principles that could potentially be applied to the U.N.
Security Council. In doing so, I begin with the narrow aim of
25. Frankel, supra note 11, at 796.
26. Joshua Getzler, “As If.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973,
975 (2011).
27. “[T]he search for a single unifying test” has been described as “fruitless,” Richard
Joyce, Fiduciary Law and Non-economic Interests, 28 MONASH U. L. REV. 239, 244 (2002), and
resting on “vain hope.” MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 9 (2010). Paul Finn began his seminal work on
Fiduciary Obligations with the proclamation that “it is meaningless to talk of fiduciary
relationships as such,” PAUL FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1 (Federation Press 2016) (1977),
while Paul Miller describes fiduciary relationships as subject to “bewilderingly disparate
characterizations.” Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 367, 374 [hereinafter Miller,
Identification]. There is said to be “considerable uncertainty over the basis, nature and scope
of fiduciary duties as well as their justification.” Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 63 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller
eds., 2014) [hereinafter Miller, Relationship]; see also Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity
and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World, 110 LAW Q. REV. 238, 246
(1994); P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 26 (T.G.
Youdan ed., 1989).
28. See L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 20 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 72-73 (1962); FINN,
supra note 27, at 1-2; Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Principles in Contemporary Common Law
Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 565, 581; Martin
Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Fiduciary Principles in European Civil Law Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 583, 585.
29. See infra Part I.A.
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examining the development of fiduciary principles within common
law systems.
A. The Fiduciary Relationship
At the heart of fiduciary law is a relationship between fiduciary
and beneficiary.30 This relationship has been described as the
central organizing construct of fiduciary law.31 Some scholars draw
a distinction between those relationships classified as fiduciary by
virtue of status, and those so classified as a matter of fact.32 In
terms of status, “[t]he exemplar of a fiduciary is often said to be a
trustee.”33 Other recognized categories of fiduciary relationship
(though not all are universally recognized)34 include agent-principal,
director-corporation, doctor-patient, lawyer-client, parent-child, and
guardian-ward.35 Beyond these established categories, it becomes
necessary to consider whether a relationship exhibits the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship such that a “fact-based” relationship can be said to exist.36 This raises the complex question as to
whether it is possible to identify an agreed set of characteristics. On
the one hand, both scholarly and judicial opinion exhibit a high
degree of uncertainty about the characteristics defining a fiduciary
relationship.37 The fiduciary relationship has been described as “one
of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law.”38 On the other
30. See Miller, Relationship, supra note 27, at 67.
31. See id.
32. Id.; cf. Lionel D. Smith, Contract, Consent, and Fiduciary Relationships, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 117, 117, 120 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016).
33. James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 LAW Q. REV. 302, 304 (2010);
Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY
LAW, supra note 16, at 41, 41.
34. For example, as Lionel Smith notes, “[s]ome detailed studies of fiduciary law do not
mention the parent-child relationship.” Lionel Smith, Parenthood Is a Fiduciary Relationship,
70 U. TORONTO L.J. 395, 396 (2020).
35. See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 969 (2013); DAVID
KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW 2 (2018);
Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 23, 26; Smith, supra note 34, at 395; Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401, 2426 (1995).
36. See Miller, Relationship, supra note 27, at 67-68.
37. See Joyce, supra note 27, at 242-43.
38. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 879.
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hand, this does not seem to have dispelled faith in the notion that
the fiduciary relationship is a distinctive form of legal relationship
with common characteristics.39
While disagreement therefore surrounds certain factors,40 there
appears to be a minimal consensus around the idea that “a fiduciary
relationship is one in which one party (the fiduciary) [has] discretionary power” to affect the legal or “practical interests of [the other]
(the beneficiary).”41 Of course, the problem is that all manner of
relations could be called fiduciary by reference to these characteristics.42 The critical element missing from this basic description is the
idea that the discretionary powers are undertaken or held “on behalf
of another” (the beneficiary).43 It is important to distinguish
“situations where a person ... has power over another person from
fiduciary situations, where a person holds power on [their] behalf.”44
This “other-regarding” or “representative” aspect has been held
to hint at a strong public dimension. Yet the “other” to whom
fiduciary law is addressed is not a general public one. A fiduciary
holds their authority “relative to a specific individual or group,” that
is “relative to particular beneficiaries ... with clearly defined
personal or common interests.”45

39. See Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
supra note 27, at 1, 1.
40. For example, disagreement persists as to whether the fiduciary relationship can only
ever be a “voluntary undertaking.” Edelman, supra note 33, at 302, 310-11.
41. Miller, supra note 1, at 262 (emphasis omitted). For similar definitions, see Frame v.
Smith, [1987] S.C.R. 99, 136 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting); Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical
Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96-97 (Austl.); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE
STATE AS FIDUCIARY 30 (2011).
42. As Worthington notes, “the characteristics are equally apt to describe the relationship
between home-owner and house-painter, diner and chef, [or] driver and other road-users.”
Worthington, supra note 13, at 505, 505 n.27; see Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Mechanics, 14
CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 25-26 (2008); Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 665, 668 (2009).
43. Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 27, at 141, 148. As Evan Fox-Decent explains, “[t]he most
significant feature of fiduciary relations that their trust quality helps to explain is the
authority of the fiduciary to act ... on behalf of the beneficiary.” Evan Fox-Decent, Trust and
Authority, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW 175, 194-95
(Paul B. Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020).
44. Smith, supra note 43, at 148.
45. Miller, Relationship, supra note 27, at 72-73.
OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
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That is not to say that a public body can never be characterised
as being in a fiduciary relationship.46 For example, in both Canada
and New Zealand, fiduciary duties have been found to apply to specific state-Indigenous dealings over property.47 However, as Kirsty
Gover has recognized,
actionable fiduciary duties only arise in circumstances where the
[state] has either assumed discretionary control over Aboriginal
interests ... or has undertaken “to act in the beneficiaries’ best
interests in the nature of a private law duty,” which entails an
undertaking to protect Aboriginal interests “in priority to other
legitimate concerns.”48

These circumstances are rare.49
By way of summary, under private domestic law, it seems that
the beating heart of the fiduciary relationship is a compound promise, which may be expressed or implied. The fiduciary relationship
stems from a reciprocal bargain under which the beneficiary either
directly or indirectly vests discretionary authority in the fiduciary
in return for a compound promise that the authority will be
exercised (1) on behalf of the beneficiary (2) in performance of the
designated representative function.50
B. The Scope of Protected Interests
Performance of the compound promise is the reason for the existence of the fiduciary relationship. It follows that fiduciaries do not
have an “unlimited or open-ended duty” to act in and promote the
46. Finn, supra note 14, at 346.
47. Id. at 350.
48. Kirsty Gover, The Honour of the Crowns: State-Indigenous Fiduciary Relationships
and Australian Exceptionalism, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 339, 357 (2016) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Man. Metis Fed’n Inc. v. Canada, [2013] S.C.R. 623, paras. 61-62 (Can.)); see also Guerin v.
The Queen, [1984] S.C.R. 335, 349-50 (Can.); Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455,
576 (Austl.); Bennett v Minister of Cmty. Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408, 426-27 (Austl.).
49. As Paul Finn notes, “the cases are few indeed in which it has been held that a public
body has had discretionary power conferred on it to be exercised on behalf of, for the benefit
of identifiable [individuals].” Finn, supra note 14, at 347-48; see, e.g., Wik Peoples v
Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 96 (Austl.); Habib v Commonwealth [No. 2] (2009) 175 FCR
350, 365 (Austl.).
50. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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overall interest of beneficiaries.51 It is said to be “an essential
characteristic of fiduciary power[s] that [they are] specified,” in the
sense that they attach to specific matters or interests.52 The extent
of the interests protected is delimited by the nature and scope of the
undertaking in any particular case.53
Nevertheless, certain legal systems appear to place a limit on the
types of interests protected by fiduciary law. Perhaps the most
significant point of dissonance relates to the question of whether
fiduciary powers can apply to noneconomic interests.54 In some
jurisdictions, protected interests have been narrowed to proprietary
or financial interests and therefore exclude the application of
fiduciary obligations to physical or emotional health or welfare.55 A
distinction is often drawn in this regard between Australian and
Canadian fiduciary law.56 As Richard Joyce has shown, Australian
courts have so far refused “to use fiduciary law to protect noneconomic interests,” even while recognizing the fiduciary nature of
relationships such as guardian-ward and doctor-patient in which
noneconomic interests are central.57 For example, in cases involving
the “sexual abuse of children allegedly suffered at the hands of
guardians, and claims arising out of [Australia’s ‘stolen Generation’]
policy of forced removal of indigenous children from their families,”
Australian courts declined to recognize fiduciary duties to protect
noneconomic interests.58 By contrast, Canadian courts have
accepted the role of fiduciary law in protecting noneconomic
interests. In Norberg v. Wynrib, a case in which a doctor issued
prescriptions for drugs to which a patient was addicted in exchange

51. Smith, supra note 34, at 400.
52. Miller, Relationship, supra note 27, at 72.
53. David Kershaw, Corporate Law’s Fiduciary Personas, 136 LAW Q. REV. 454, 454, 479
(2020).
54. See Joyce, supra note 27, at 267.
55. See id. at 240.
56. As Paul Finn notes, “fiduciary law in Canada has followed—and is following—quite
different courses to that followed in Australia.” Finn, supra note 14, at 339 n.31.
57. See Joyce, supra note 27, at 250.
58. Id. at 240 (first citing Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 90 FCR 489 (Austl.); then citing
Williams v Minister Aboriginal Land Rts. Act 1983 (1999) 25 Fam LR 86 (Austl.); and then
citing Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 (Austl.)); see also Breen v Williams (1996)
186 CLR 71 (Austl.) (upholding a Court of Appeals decision that fiduciary law imposed no
obligation to provide medical records).
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for sexual favours,59 Justice McLachlin opined that fiduciary
principles “are capable of protecting not only narrow legal and
economic interests, but can also serve to defend fundamental human
and personal interests.”60
It is clear that fiduciary protection of noneconomic interests
cannot yet be said to have achieved general acceptance. However,
the logic of this position is questionable. Chief fiduciary legal
historian Joshua Getzler describes fiduciary law as rooted not just
in history but in “human nature” with “its distinctive functions in
upholding trust ... in professional and intimate relationships.”61
Whether the interests are economic or noneconomic does not seem
to be the point. The more pertinent questions seem to be (1) whether
the interests relate in any relevant way to the fiduciary powers
undertaken; and (2) whether the fiduciary’s conduct in relation to a
given interest transgresses recognized fiduciary obligations.
C. Fiduciary Obligations
According to some scholars, fiduciary obligations are the distinctive organizing idea of fiduciary law; this view is captured in Paul
Finn’s account that a person “is not subject to fiduciary obligations
because he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that he
is a fiduciary.”62
While “[t]he phrase ‘fiduciary duties’” has also been denoted as
“dangerous” on the basis that it “giv[es] rise to [the] mistaken
assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances,”63 it is possible to identify certain core fiduciary obligations.
59. Joyce, supra note 27, at 251.
60. Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 239, 289 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., concurring);
see also McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 150 (Can.) (holding unanimously that
a doctor was under a fiduciary duty to comply with a patient’s request for a copy of all
information in her medical file); M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 6, 24 (Can.) (holding that
incest is a breach of fiduciary duty); J. (L.A.) v. J.(H.), [1993] 102 D.L.R. 4th 177, 183 (Can.
Ont.) (relating to sexual exploitation within families).
61. Getzler, supra note 26, at 975-76.
62. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1998] 1 AC (Ch) [18] (appeal taken from Eng.)
(discussing Finn’s work); see also Finn, supra note 27, at 2; Edelman, supra note 33, at 316
(“[T]he label ‘fiduciary’ is a conclusion which is reached only once it is determined that
particular duties are owed.”).
63. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC (HL) 145, 206 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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1. Duty of Loyalty
The animating essence of fiduciary law is said to be the duty of
loyalty.64 Yet Birks considers that the term loyalty “fails to hit the
nail on the head.”65 Indeed, the duty seems to relate more precisely
to the absence of exploitation.66 As D. Gordon Smith explains it,
“[t]he duty that is distinctive of fiduciaries arises out of a concern
that the fiduciary will take advantage of the beneficiary.”67 As with
so many other aspects of fiduciary law, the content of this duty is
subject to differing interpretations. While there are broader and
narrower versions of the duty, the irreducible core relates to two
duties: the duty to avoid conflicting interests (no-conflicts rule) and
the duty not to profit from the fiduciary office (no-profit rule).68
These rules have been said to be a natural law of all civil societies,
found in all developed legal systems.69 According to the no-conflicts
rule, the fiduciary has a duty not to put themselves in a position in
which their duty to the beneficiary might conflict with either (a)
their self-interest; or (b) duties they owe third parties.70 Under the
no-profit rule, the fiduciary may not take unauthorized profits or
personal gains from the fiduciary position, however innocent in
intent and even when the profit does not subtract from the beneficiary’s assets.71
2. Duty of Care
A broader view of fiduciary duty requires affirmative action on the
part of the fiduciary. While it is generally accepted that equity imposes proscriptive duties on the fiduciary not to obtain unauthorized
64. See Birks, supra note 13, at 11.
65. Id. at 12.
66. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1408 (2002).
67. Id.
68. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 16 (1975).
69. See York Bldgs. Co. v. Mackenzie [1795] 3 Eng. Rep. 432, 446 (“It proceeds from
nature, and is silently received, recognised, and made effectual wherever any well regulated
system of civil jurisprudence is known.... [That] [h]e that is entrusted with the interest of
others, cannot be allowed to make the business an object of interest to himself.”).
70. Edelman, supra note 33, at 318.
71. See York Bldgs. Co., 3 Eng. Rep. at 448.
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benefit or be in a position of conflict, there is continuing debate as
to whether fiduciary duties extend to prescriptive duties of care.72 In
some jurisdictions, it is recognised that a duty of care and skill is
owed by fiduciaries.73 This duty of care is different from that owed
in tort under the law of negligence74 and arguably requires a higher
standard of care. By contrast to the negative duty that exists in tort
law to avoid careless conduct that could cause reasonably foreseeable harm to others, the fiduciary duty of care is unrelated to harm
and requires simply that fiduciaries act with care, skill and
diligence in performing their tasks under a fiduciary mandate.75
Moreover, the standard of care owed by a fiduciary will take into
account the particular expertise and influence of the fiduciary,
rather than assessing conduct (for example) based on a general
standard of reasonableness.76 If the essence of the duty of loyalty is
to prevent exploitation, the essence of the duty of care is to prevent
a fiduciary squandering their authority.
3. Subsidiary Duties
In addition to the core fiduciary obligations, there are a number
of “other fiduciary duties” (sometimes referred to as “subsidiary”
fiduciary duties) that may serve a role in implementing the primary
duties of loyalty and care in particular fiduciary relationships.77
These may include duties of disclosure, duties of confidentiality, and
the duty to inform and render an account.78 The latter duty is
regarded as intrinsic to both the duty of loyalty and care, justified
in psychological terms on the basis that “[p]eople behave differently
72. Lionel Smith, Prescriptive Fiduciary Duties, 37 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 261, 261-62 (2018);
see also Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 (Austl.).
73. Smith, supra note 72, at 262.
74. Id. at 268.
75. Birks, supra note 13, at 17-18, 28-29.
76. Cf. Frankel, supra note 11, at 809-10 (describing the fiduciary relationship as a tradeoff in which the beneficiary gives up control over the fiduciary’s decision-making in exchange
for effective use of the fiduciary’s specialized expertise in making those decisions).
77. Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 419, 419.
78. See Birks, supra note 13, at 26 n.48, 27-29 (discussing the duty to account and
describing the duties of disclosure and confidentiality as components of the fiduciary duty of
disinterestedness).
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when they believe that they must account for their judgments and
choices.”79
II. THE FIDUCIARY CONSTRUCT AS A PRECEPT OF AUTHORITY
In recent years, the fiduciary construct has been applied to a wide
range of public institutions and legal regimes, both at national and
international levels. One can understand the temptation to analogize relationships of public governance to a fiduciary relationship.
Similar to fiduciaries, the state stands in a position of power in relation to its population and is in a better position than many to exercise discretion that can affect the legal and practical interests of
those within its jurisdiction.80 Public powers are by their nature
other-regarding, “entrusted [in public authorities] so that they can
exercise them on behalf of the public or a section of the public.”81 Of
course, even in a democracy, populations are “vulnerable to exploitation [and] opportunism on the part of their [elected representatives].”82 Therefore, the key criteria of fiduciary relationships—
other-regarding discretionary power (on the part of the governors)
and vulnerability to this power (on the part of those governed)—are
present in the relationship between the state and its population.83
Yet we should be cautious not to conflate fiduciary principles
applicable as between a state and its people (which I will refer to as
public fiduciary theory) with the legal principle as it exists in
private law. Public fiduciary theory shares no common genetic
material with the legal principle, certainly in terms of its origin.84
This is not to say that the legal principle cannot apply as between
the state and individuals or groups in certain circumstances in
which the state acts in a private legal capacity and undertakes to
79. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fiduciary Law and Psychology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 720. It is also said to have particular historical significance,
detailed by Joshua Getzler. Getzler, supra note 26, at 977.
80. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Hyman [2002] 1 AC (HL) 408, 416 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
81. Id.
82. D. Theodore Rave, Two Problems of Fiduciary Governance, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT
49, 50 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018).
83. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 29; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 472-73 (2010).
84. See infra Part II.A.
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protect a concrete interest of an individual or group, as discussed
above.85 Yet in the context of public fiduciary theory, the term
fiduciary is used not in the private legal sense but as a form of legal
metaphor to underpin a model of authority for public institutions.86
A. Source
The authority approach to the fiduciary construct is based on the
idea that integral to public office is public trust.87 Though the theory
may draw on private law in terms of the content of the fiduciary
construct, it does not generally do so in terms of source.88 This line
of thought makes no detour through the English courts of common
law and equity where the equitable private law fiduciary doctrine
finds its genesis.89 Instead, its origins are found in modern political
thought. For this reason, the approach is often referred to as
“fiduciary political theory” rather than fiduciary law.90
In Sovereignty’s Promise, one of the foundational texts for this
theory, Evan Fox-Decent sets out a brief history of the private law
fiduciary concept but rightly makes no attempt to link this with the
sources that form the foundations of his fiduciary theory.91 Instead,
Fox-Decent locates the theory’s foundations in what might be
described as a Kantian interpretation of Hobbes. Elsewhere, FoxDecent draws on Hobbes to explain that the office of the sovereign
arises from the people’s trust.92 He highlights “Hobbes’s pervasive
use of the language of trust,” suggesting this reveals Hobbes’s
perspective that the language of trust is more persuasive than the
85. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
86. Cf., e.g., FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 105.
87. See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125
YALE L.J. 1820, 1825-26 (2016).
88. An exception is Miller and Gold’s principle of “fiduciary governance.” Paul B. Miller
& Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 556 (2015).
89. See Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in
MAPPING THE LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER BIRKS 577, 590 (Andrew Burrows & Lord
Rodger of Earlsferry eds., 2006).
90. See, e.g., Leib & Galoob, supra note 87, at 1822. In Sovereignty’s Promise, Evan FoxDecent refers to his theory variously as “fiduciary theory of the state,” “fiduciary theory of
public authority” and “fiduciary theory of legal authority.” FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 39,
48, 49.
91. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 30-34.
92. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 288 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651).
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language of consent as a means to establish the legitimacy of the
ongoing relationship between the sovereign and their subjects.93
According to Fox-Decent, “the legitimacy and stability of sovereignty
is necessarily a joint endeavour of sovereign and subject premised
on mutual trust.”94 Fox-Decent uses a “Kantian conception of right”
as the foundation for his description of the moral idea of trust, in
particular each individual’s innate right to equal freedom and
dignity.95 The justification for constraints on governmental action is
“agency-based: it conceives of individuals as sources of [innate] legal
and moral claims [by] virtue of their agency and the legal relationships in which they find themselves.”96 It follows from these innate
rights that individuals cannot stand in a relationship of domination
to one another nor can they instrumentalize each other.97 To the
extent that the state exercises irresistible discretionary power over
individuals, who are vulnerable by virtue of this power, this “is
premised on a presumption of trust,” whose “normative constitution”
necessarily entails the “principles of non-instrumentalization and
non-domination.”98 According to Fox-Decent, “[a]n important consequence of the presumption of trust is that it renders the fiduciary
[state’s] exercise of power justifiable to the beneficiary, for it is on
the beneficiary’s trust that the fiduciary’s authority depends.”99
Scholars promoting the application of fiduciary law to the state
and other public institutions accept that this approach relates to the
foundations of public authority.100 Fox-Decent’s theory professes to
relate to the legitimacy of authority, not its legal pedigree: “the
fiduciary account of legal obligation, if successful, will imply an
93. Fox-Decent, supra note 43, at 183.
94. Id. at 184.
95. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 43, 46.
96. Id. at 238.
97. Id. at 43.
98. Id. at 44, 105.
99. Id. at 105.
100. See id. at 89; Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Mapping Public
Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 27,
at 388, 388; Leib & Galoob, supra note 87, at 1826; D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Principles
and the State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 323, 323-24;
see also Andrew S. Gold, Reflections on the State as Fiduciary, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 655, 669
(2013) (reviewing EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE (2011)); David L. Ponet &
Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1256
(2011).
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account of state legitimacy.”101 The problem is that, as this account
develops, the fiduciary construct is reinterpreted as the source of
authority. In its private law incarnation, fiduciary law takes the
form of adjective law in the sense that it does not itself confer or
establish decision-making authority, but enforces undertakings that
are said (expressly or impliedly) to accompany its conferral.102 Yet
under Fox-Decent’s theory, he explains that “[t]rust and the
fiduciary principle’s authorization of state power best justify legal
authority” and portrays fiduciary obligations as obligations that not
only constrain but “constitute the state’s legal authority.”103
The problem is magnified by the claim made by theorists such as
Fox-Decent and Leib and Galoob that public fiduciary theory is able
to serve as an alternative to (rather than a potential complement of)
consent theories of authority.104 Fox-Decent argues that fiduciary
theory addresses the fundamental problem with consent theories
that “few individuals have ever explicitly consented to anything like
the vast authority states claim.... [While] some individuals and
groups ... reject outright the state’s claims to authority over
them.”105 Fox-Decent instead argues that trust provides the foundation of state authority because “the state is required to act on the
basis of our trust (and so within fiduciary limits) even if we happen
to distrust the state intensely.”106 While this seems to render trust
just as hypothetical or tacit as the concept of consent under consent
theories, this description is most problematic because it inverts the
connection between authority and trust as traditionally understood
in fiduciary law.107 Rather than seeing the role of fiduciary law as
providing limits to authority so as to enable trust, trust and
fiduciary law are instead described as enabling authority.108 While
it is easy to agree that consent provides an insufficient or even
artificial foundation for public authority,109 the problem shared by
101. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 115; see id. at 96, 113, 114, 125-29, 134, 239-40.
102. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 804; Miller, Relationship, supra note 27, at 70-71.
103. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 89, 239.
104. See id. at 108-09; Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory and
Legitimacy, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT, supra note 82, at 163, 171.
105. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 117.
106. Id. at 109.
107. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
108. Fox-Decent, supra note 43, at 194-95.
109. For the position in international law, see, for example, BAûAK ÇALI, THE AUTHORITY
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consent theory and Fox-Decent’s articulation of public fiduciary
theory is that it focuses on the (hypothetical or tacit) act of the
beneficiary public rather than active undertakings by the fiduciary
state.110
The problems with claiming this inflated role for the fiduciary
construct, of establishing rather than limiting authority, become
clear when we look at the content of the principle. Reference to
modern political thought is significant to our understanding of the
link between public trust and the legitimacy of public authority, a
link that can also be substantiated empirically.111 Yet when such a
broad goal is channelled through the fiduciary construct, the focus
of the construct can become refracted by the plurality of interests in
the beneficiary public and we can lose sight of the significance of the
relevant constitutional or legislative mandate granting authority.112
In delineating governmental legal obligations, I argue that it is
more important to focus on the “covenant” (that is the legal undertaking by public authorities) than the “social contract” (the
mechanics of political agreement by the beneficiaries). The relevant
source of fiduciary obligations is not that of the beneficiary—either
in consenting or trusting—but in the act of the fiduciary’s undertaking to exercise discretionary power on behalf of others.113 This is in
the nature of a promise, creating a legitimate expectation in the

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: OBEDIENCE, RESPECT, AND REBUTTAL

24-32 (2015).
110. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 109, 117.
111. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013, at 20-35
(2013), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2013-en.pdf?expires=1611543285&
id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4078D304638F20DA4B8B3725EE63FDA4 [https://perma.
cc/BK9H-RFEX]. See generally Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Trust and Public Policy: How
Better Governance Can Help Rebuild Public Trust, OECD PUB. GOVERNANCE REVS. (2017),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264268920-en.pdf?expires=1611543689&id=id&
accname=guest&checksum=88CF16E18BA8EE2C9F5DBEAFE74A6E4B [https://perma.cc/
5ECW-URKK].
112. See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1145, 1162-63 (2014) (“[T]rust law defines the fiduciary duties of trustees by reference to a
discrete class of beneficiaries, whose interests are discernible and observable.... There is no
real analogue in public law.... At some level, there is likely to be broad agreement that public
officials should treat all citizens fairly. But that just restates the difficult questions that arise
from our constitutional commitments.”).
113. Cf. Frankel, supra note 11, at 820 (observing that a fiduciary’s consent to undertake
the relationship is required in order to trigger a fiduciary relationship and its attendant
obligations).
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public that this promise will be fulfilled, an expectation that we
might call the public trust.
B. Content
The terminology of fiduciary is deployed in the public governance
context as a type of legal metaphor. In assessing the content and
parameters of public fiduciary theory, it is relevant to consider
whether the theory as developed has remained faithful to the
essence rather than the contextual particularities of its private
counterpart. Fiduciary principles serve to underwrite the beneficiary’s trust by enforcing the undertakings that are at its heart.
I have described the fiduciary relationship above as stemming
from a reciprocal bargain under which the beneficiary directly or
indirectly vests discretionary authority in the fiduciary in return for
a compound promise that the authority will be exercised (1) on
behalf of the beneficiary (2) to fulfill the representative purpose for
which it was vested.114 If we carry this through by analogy to the
public sphere, the promise is transformed into one that public
decision-making authority will be exercised (1) on behalf of the
public (2) for the purpose of advancing public interests. Under the
fiduciary analogy, public trust thereby inheres in the public
fiduciary’s joint undertakings that the exercise of authority will be
representative (that is, on behalf of the public) and adequately
advance the public mandate vested in it. The question is whether
the construct as developed in the existing literature serves to
protect or advance these two undertakings. In the following
Sections, I explore how this has been achieved and examine the
extent to which it can be said the principle has stayed true to the
fiduciary metaphor that underpins it.
1. The Fiduciary Relationship
Public fiduciary theory has been described as a “relational conception” of legal authority.115 The argument is that “an overarching
fiduciary relationship exists between the state and [those] subject
114. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
115. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 40.
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to its authority,” and that this relationship “generates legal
duties.”116 The complication in this sphere is that the fiduciary
relationship must be translated from the “interpersonal” context of
private law117 to the polycentric context of public authority, with its
multiplication of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and purposes.
There has been extensive debate on the identification of the
beneficiary in the public sphere.118 Leib, Ponet, and Serota highlight
the problem that “loose mapping of fiduciary-beneficiary relationships in the public sphere precludes a clear understanding of whose
interests are pertinent to the public fiduciary’s representation, and
what the public fiduciary is to do when beneficiaries’ interests
diverge or collide.”119 Evan Fox-Decent argues that the relationship
is between the state and “the persons subject to their authority”120
regardless of the “civil or political status of the person subject to
state authority.”121 Theodore Rave construes the relationship as one
between “democratically elected representatives in our constitutional system” and “the people they represent.”122 Leib, Ponet, and
Serota by contrast contemplate the idea of a “shifting constellation
of beneficiaries,”123 recognizing in the case of a U.S. state-level
legislator that her potential beneficiaries could include “her district’s residents” (regardless of how they voted), “citizens of the
state,” “the nation’s citizenry,” and “future generations.”124 Some
scholars have argued that public fiduciary theory should draw
answers from private law contexts when fiduciary liability to
multiple beneficiaries with conflicting interests is contemplated,
such as the corporate context in which fiduciaries must engage with
the interests of different groups of shareholders.125
116. Id. at 28-29.
117. Miller & Gold, supra note 88, at 516.
118. Leib et al., supra note 100, at 398.
119. Id. at 389.
120. Fox-Decent, supra note 43, at 194.
121. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 40. Writing with Evan Criddle (translating the theory
to the sphere of international institutions) the relevant beneficiary is described as “humanity.”
EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 288 (2016).
122. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 713 (2013).
123. Leib et al., supra note 100, at 401.
124. Id. at 398-400.
125. Id. at 401-02; Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491,
493 (2012). As David Kershaw points out, the fiduciary relationship is also potentially plural
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Yet this focus on the identity of beneficiaries arguably mischaracterizes the fiduciary problem. The focus of public fiduciary
theory should not be on the scope of the beneficiaries but on the
scope of the undertaking to exercise a public mandate.126 This may
be an important point at which to distinguish public fiduciary
theory from private fiduciary law. Under the private law analysis of
fiduciary liability, liability is effectuated through “correlatively
structured rights and duties that make fiduciaries directly and
personally accountable to beneficiaries.”127 Rather than translating
this personal undertaking between fiduciary and beneficiary to the
public context, we should instead focus on the different nature of the
undertaking. Public fiduciary theory is based not on a personal
undertaking to particular individuals or groups but rather on an
undertaking to exercise a public mandate.128 As I explore in the next
Section, the focus of public fiduciary theory should not be on
accountability to discrete beneficiaries but on accountability to the
public purpose the fiduciary is authorized to serve.
2. Protected Interests
The shift of the fiduciary construct from interpersonal relationships to the context of public authority requires a shift from
administration of concrete interests to something different. As Paul
Finn has recognized, the functions of public powers “as a rule, are
to further public purposes, not the interests [or purposes of a
particular person or] persons as such.”129 The argument is that
public fiduciary theory is concerned with faithfulness to the
in the corporate context from the perspective that the bilateral relationship of fiduciary and
beneficiary converts to the “trilateral relationship between [the] corporation as an entity and
its constituent parts or organs [of] the board and the shareholder meeting.” DAVID KERSHAW,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW 347 (2018).
126. See Miller & Gold, supra note 88, at 517-18 (theorizing that a subset of fiduciary
relationships are governed by “[f]iduciary governance mandates ... in which the fiduciary is
engaged to determine or advance certain abstract purposes” and that in these relationships,
“[t]he powers of the fiduciary, and the objects for which he acts, are specifiable entirely with
reference to one or more abstract purposes without it being necessary to identify a
beneficiary”).
127. Id. at 553-54; see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 10-11 (2012); ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 116-20 (1995).
128. See Miller & Gold, supra note 88, at 525.
129. Finn, supra note 14, at 343.
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purpose(s) for which fiduciary powers were vested rather than
particular concrete interests.130 In their work on the concept of
fiduciary governance, Miller and Gold have distinguished between
a “service mandate,” in which fiduciary powers are exercised in the
service of interests of a determinate group of persons, and a
“governance mandate” in which “the fiduciary’s discretion is to be
oriented to the achievement of certain objectives” held relative to
collectivities as opposed to being “identifi[able] with determinate
persons and their practical interests.”131
The question then becomes how to characterize or identify these
objectives or purposes. Some scholars have defined them broadly as
“promot[ing] the public welfare”132 or the “substantial interest in
living in a world that is neither a Hobbesian state of nature nor one
left to the caprice of an arbitrary ruler.”133 The problem with this
approach is that it thins out considerably the scope of fiduciary
obligations, leaving public fiduciaries with broad discretion
accountable only to abstract and effectively unenforceable standards.134 Other scholars have interpreted public purposes more in
line with the private law context as including the multifaceted
preferences and interests of members of the beneficiary public.135
For example, in Leib, Serota, and Ponet’s detailed work on judges
as fiduciaries, they contend that “a fiduciary needs some knowledge
of beneficiaries’ preferences and interests to do a good job as a
fiduciary when entrusted to make decisions on their behalf.”136 On
this basis, they argue that judges must make “an authentic effort to
130. Id. As Fox-Decent explains, “the most fundamental and general fiduciary duty is not
loyalty to an individual or a discrete class of beneficiaries, but fidelity to the other-regarding
purposes for which fiduciary power is held.” FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 37.
131. Miller & Gold, supra note 88, at 523-24.
132. Criddle, supra note 83, at 466; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of
Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 136-38 (2006).
133. FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 112.
134. For example, Evan Criddle acknowledges that the concept of public welfare is
“radically indeterminate at the margins” and “a fundamentally contested concept,” such that
“[a]fter satisfying the basic principles of fiduciary administration, regulators may find that
they still enjoy substantial discretion to determine what policy alternative will best advance
Congress’s general purposes and promote the broader public welfare.” Criddle, supra note 83,
at 490-491.
135. See Ethan Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 699, 712 (2013).
136. Id. at 741.
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uncover preferences rather than a mere hypothetical projection of
what beneficiaries might want.”137 The problem with this construction is that it conflates the public mandate with the subjective
interests of the beneficiary public, or individuals and groups within
it. The role of the judge is not to seek and serve the interests of
certain sectors of the public, even the interests of a majority of the
public, but to perform the allocated judicial function.138 In a highprofile criminal law case, there may be a public clamour to convict
when technical legal rules prevent admission of relevant evidence
necessary to secure a guilty verdict. The judicial role in this scenario
requires the judge to apply applicable rules of evidence rather than
providing the public with the conviction they so desire. In other
words, the role of the judge is to uphold the judicial function rather
than public preferences regarding the outcome of particular cases.139
In conclusion, the protected interest in public fiduciary theory
should neither be overly generalized so as to be unascertainable nor
narrowly construed so as merely to serve the public’s interests or
preferences in a particular context. Rather, the fiduciary construct
serves to protect and ensure performance of and adherence to the
public mandate. The legitimate expectation of the public is that the
public authority will fulfill their mandate, rather than serve their
particular interests or preferences.140
3. Fiduciary Obligations
Recourse to the fiduciary metaphor in public fiduciary theory
presumes the theory to be one that focuses on protection and
justification of the public trust.141 I characterize the goal of the
fiduciary construct, as conventionally understood, as underwriting
trust by ensuring the fiduciary neither exploits their authority by
prioritizing self-interest or that of third parties (duty of loyalty), nor
squanders their authority by failing to adequately fulfill their
mandate (duty of care).142 The question is whether the obligations
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
See Miller & Gold, supra note 88, at 569.
See id. at 569-70.
Cf. id. at 553.
See FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 89.
See supra Part I.C.
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or duties imposed by the fiduciary construct can be translated to the
context of public authority in a way that is intelligible and fit for the
purpose.
We explore this question by examining the work of prominent
public fiduciary theorists. Here, we see that the obligations recognized do not always map onto fiduciary obligations as conventionally
conceived. For example, the ambitious goal of Evan Fox-Decent’s
theory as constituting public authority has knock-on effects for the
scope of fiduciary obligations.143 Fox-Decent claims that “[t]he
content of the [fiduciary] obligation is to govern in accordance with
the rule of law.”144 Fox-Decent adopts “Fuller’s eight canons of the
internal morality of law [as giving] content of the rule of law,”
linking this to the agency-based justification on which his theory
rests.145 What is notable is that the connection to public trust forms
no express part of this chain of reasoning.146 Indeed, Fuller’s
internal morality of law, with its commitment to generality,
publicity, clarity, prospectivity, constancy, feasibility, consistency
and congruence, does not connect neatly (if indeed at all) to the
fiduciary construct’s commitment to the nonexploitation and due
performance of public mandates.147 That is not to say Fuller’s
internal morality does not serve valuable ends, it is just that it
serves other values than those served by the fiduciary construct. In
Fuller’s own words, the aspirational aim of the internal morality is
to identify the conditions of legal order that will enable persons “to
find the good life in a life shared with others.”148 A more faithful
implementation of the fiduciary metaphor would see public fiduciary
theory focus on the double-edged fiduciary aim of ensuring that
public authority is not exploited or squandered to the extent that it
cannot be said to fulfill its representative or purposive aims.

143. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 41, at 237.
144. Id.; see id. at 134.
145. Id. at 238; see id. (“[A] commitment to the internal morality entails respect for human
agency; respect for human agency entails respect for human dignity; and respect for human
dignity entails respect for human rights.”)
146. See id. at 237-38.
147. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39 (rev. ed. 1969).
148. Id. at 13. Fuller described the inner morality as “a morality of aspiration and not of
duty.” Id. at 43.
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III. THE FIDUCIARY CONSTRUCT AS INTERNATIONAL PRECEPT
In The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, David Caron notes that “perceptions of [the Security
Council’s] illegitimacy may ... arise from both the failure to use
authority effectively and the abuse of authority.”149 The fiduciary
construct offers a potential legal basis by which to censure both
forms of transgression. In this Part, I consider whether fiduciary
principles have a role to play in the Security Council setting and, if
so, how the relevant legal cross-pollination might play out. From a
legal doctrinal perspective, one might construe the inquiry as a
positivist one, examining whether fiduciary principles form part of
existing international law. However, if we take a more normative
perspective, we might determine that our role as lawyers in this
setting should be more visionary. As Roberto Mangabeira Unger
would have it, legal analysis should be focused less in searching for
“recurrent doctrinal categories and distinctions” and more on the
role of domestic law and legal principles as “animating idea[s]” from
which contextualised rules can be forged in the interplay between
legal imagination and power.150
In pursuing both positivist and normative lines of inquiry,
drawing on and guided respectively by the literature on fiduciary
law and fiduciary theory discussed above, two different versions of
the fiduciary construct emerge as potentially applicable in the
Security Council setting. The first is more particularized, examining
whether the Security Council can ever be said to act as fiduciary in
relation to certain individual or group interests.151 The second is
more generalized, examining the role of the Council vis-à-vis the
international community more broadly.152 I identify and distinguish

149. David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87
AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 561 (1993). Ian Hurd also discusses how problems of “independence and
hypocrisy” can make the Council “less useful to those trying to invoke its power-byassociation, and may contribute to its marginalization.” IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY:
LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 195 (2007).
150. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination, 59 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1996).
151. See infra Part III.A.
152. See infra Part III.B.
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below between these as the contractual and constitutional versions
of the fiduciary construct, which derive from different sources and
enable us to differentiate between obligations owed to particular
individuals or groups and those owed more generally to the
international community.
A. The Contractual Concept
The construction of fiduciary obligations as contractual is considered in some legal systems as a subject of dispute.153 This Article
does not seek to take a position in this debate. Rather, in considering the translation of the fiduciary construct to the international
sphere, the term “contractual” is helpful to distinguish the nature
of the undertaking at the heart of the relevant fiduciary relationship. In differentiating between contractual and constitutional
constructs, the intent is to distinguish an interpersonal undertaking
made by a public institution to an individual or group of individuals
from the general undertaking made by a public institution to the
public at large.
In assessing the application of the contractual model in any
particular case, the key question is whether it is possible to identify
the source of an undertaking made or assumed by the fiduciary to
the beneficiary that discretionary power will be exercised (1) on the
beneficiary’s behalf, and (2) to advance or preserve particular
protected interests. The source of this undertaking may be in a
Security Council resolution, an agreement entered into by subsidiary organs or agents of the Council, regulations passed by such
organs, or even a treaty. If this undertaking exists, the question
becomes whether fiduciary obligations can be said to arise under
international law. In the absence of any separate treaty foundation

153. For representative publications of the minority position that fiduciary obligations are
contractual, see Edelman, supra note 33, at 302-04; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993). This position is more
accepted in civil systems and their progenitors. For example, under Roman law certain legal
principles such as fiducia and mandatum arose directly under the law of contract and
stemmed from a contractual obligation to hold property or money on the understanding that
(1) it will be reconveyed or (2) used in good faith to carry out a particular undertaking. David
Johnston, Fiduciary Principles in Roman Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 16, at 505, 507-09 (2019).
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for the obligations,154 the question is whether such obligations exist
under one of the pedigree sources of international law.155
The category of general principles seems more fitting than
customary international law as the source through which to import
the fiduciary construct. Fittingly (given the equitable source of
fiduciary law), general principles as a source category is sometimes
described as closely associated to, and even as originating from,
equity and, its direct relation, natural law.156 Like equitable
principles, the role of general principles is to assist the proper
functioning of the international system of justice.157 Brierly noted
that general principles can be drawn from principles of private law
when applicable to international relations:
Private law, being in general more developed than international
law, has always constituted a sort of reserve store of principles
upon which international law has drawn.... for the good reason
that a principle which is found to be generally accepted by
established legal systems may fairly be assumed to be so
reasonable as to be necessary to the maintenance of justice
under any system.158

According to the methodology for the establishment of general
principles, the fiduciary construct will be recognized as such if its
basic notions can be shown to be common to the principal legal
systems of the world and transposable to the international legal
system.159 There is not scope in this Article to undertake the
154. There is no express recognition of fiduciary obligations owed to individuals or groups
of individuals in treaty law. More attention will be given below as to whether the U.N.
Charter can be interpreted to recognize the existence of obligations owed to the international
community more broadly. See infra Part III.B.1.
155. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1.
156. See Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International Law, Remarks at the Proceedings of the
Eighty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 22, 1988),
in PROC. 82D ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. at 277, 290; Michael Akehurst, Equity and
General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 801, 814 (1976).
157. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 386-88 (1987).
158. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS 63-64 (7th ed. 2012). See generally H.
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
159. Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez (Special Rapporteur), Second Rep. on General Principles
of Law, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/741 (Apr. 9, 2020). As Judge McNair famously expressed in
the South-West Africa advisory opinion:
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detailed comparative analysis required to confirm this position.
However, available literature affirms that basic principles of
fiduciary law exist in a variety of legal systems including European
civil law systems, India, Islamic law, Japan, and Roman law.160
According to this legal principle, when an international decision
maker such as the Security Council assumes discretionary control
over the concrete interests of an individual or individuals, fiduciary
obligations may arise in circumstances of an express or implied
undertaking that the decision maker will act (1) on behalf of the
beneficiary (2) for the purpose of protecting the latter’s interests.161
The existence of such an undertaking, its nature, and its scope
will need to be established on a case by case basis through an
examination of relevant documents. Undertakings to particular
individuals or groups to exercise discretionary authority over their
concrete interests on their behalf may be express or implicit in U.N.
Security Council resolutions, in agreements entered into with the
Council or its officials (for example, Status of Forces Agreements),
or in policy statements issued by the Council. In these circumstances, the Council and its officials may be bound by a duty of
loyalty, such that public officials are prohibited from exploiting their
authority and acting either in self-interest or to serve the interests
of third parties.162 They would also be bound by a duty of care and
are not entitled to squander their authority through failing to
exercise due diligence to protect the beneficiary’s interest.163
The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by means of
importing private law institutions “lock, stock and barrel,” ready-made and fully
equipped with a set of rules.... [T]he true view of the duty of international
tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology which are
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy
and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions.
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July 11)
(separate opinion by McNair, J.).
160. See Gelter & Helleringer, supra note 28, at 583; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Fiduciary
Principles in Indian Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at
623, 623; Mohammad Fadel, Fiduciary Principles in Classical Islamic Law Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 525, 525; J. Mark Ramseyer &
Masayuki Tamaruya, Fiduciary Principles in Japanese Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 16, at 643, 643; Johnston, supra note 153, at 505.
161. See supra Part I.A.
162. See supra Part I.C.1.
163. See supra Part I.C.2.
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Violation of either undertaking would constitute a betrayal of trust
and must be remedied.164 Notably, no consensus currently exists
that the construct extends beyond the protection of economic
interests.165
B. The Constitutional Concept
While there will be some narrow circumstances in which the
Security Council may undertake to protect the interests of particular individuals and groups, these particularized interests are not the
typical focus of the Council’s mandate. When international organizations, practitioners, and scholars reference the value of “trust” in
international organizations and their officials, they are referring not
to the trust of particular individuals or groups, but to something
more akin to the “public trust.”166 This raises the question of the role
of trust in legitimizing or strengthening the authority of international organizations such as the Security Council and the potential
role of law in underwriting trust in this context. Here, public
fiduciary theory might open up an interesting line of inquiry,
illuminating a possible reference point for the legitimation of
Security Council authority that has been given inadequate attention
in the discourse surrounding the formulation of legal parameters for
the Council’s conduct: that of public trust. I refer to this conception
as the constitutional construct in recognition that it relates to the
attribution and distribution of authority in the international
context.167
164. For further discussion of fiduciary remedies, see generally J.R. Maurice Gautreau,
Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique, 68 CAN. BAR REV. 1 (1989); Getzler, supra note 26.
165. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Dag Hammarskjöld, The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,
Lecture at Oxford University (May 30, 1961), in 100 YEARS INT’L CIV. SERV., at 4, 6-11, https://
www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/the-international-civil-servant-in-law-and-in-fact/
[https://perma.cc/2UXY-4GVR]; Anne Peters, The Security Council, Functions and Powers,
Article 24, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 761, ¶ 48 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy amid the
Challenges of New Technology: What Role for the Law of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 9 (2018); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013).
167. It is important to distinguish this approach from the U.S. constitutionalist account of
the fiduciary law, which derives fiduciary duties from the text, historical context and
structure of the U.S. Constitution as a “fiduciary instrument.” See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY
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I conclude from my analysis of the literature on public fiduciary
theory above that the public trust is based in a compound promise
made expressly or implicitly by public institutions wielding discretionary power.168 The trust or fiduciary element is based in
recognition that the public institution in question will exercise
discretionary power (1) on behalf of the public and (2) to advance the
purpose(s) for which it is allocated.169 The role of fiduciary obligations is accordingly to ensure the exercise of discretionary power is
both representative and purposeful.
Application of this fiduciary construct to the Security Council will
be appropriate only if the underlying compound undertaking can be
attributed to the Council. This gives rise to some thorny questions:
Is Security Council authority intended to be representative? Is it
possible to identify with any certainty what purpose or purposes the
Council is obliged to serve under its mandate? Are Council members
permitted to act in self-interest or in the interest of third parties? Is
it appropriate to recognize that the Council has a duty to act in
certain circumstances? The first two questions relate to the
existence of a fiduciary relationship and the interests or purposes it
might serve. The latter two questions relate to the content of any
fiduciary obligations. Ultimately, all questions have to be answered
by reference to the constitutional instrument of the Security
Council, namely the U.N. Charter, interpreted by reference to an
analysis of its history, text, context, and developing practice in the
application of its provisions.170
SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 47
(2017); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2119 (2019); Leib et al., supra note 135, at 702-03; Robert
G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1083, 1087-88,
1128, 1168 (2004). For a critique of this account, see Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against
Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV. 1479, 1482-83 (2020).
168. See supra Part II.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. According to established principles of treaty interpretation, it is widely accepted that
the U.N. Charter can be interpreted by reference to its text, considered in its context and in
“light of its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. In addition to context, it is acceptable to take into account
any subsequent agreement or practice in the application of the treaty and any relevant rules
of international law. See id. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was recognized
as applicable to the U.N. Charter in, inter alia, Application of Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment 2007

2021]

ON TRUST: THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AS FIDUCIARY

1263

1. The Fiduciary Relationship
The fiduciary construct finds its central habitat in the exercise of
discretionary power that can be characterized as other-regarding.171
The idea is that this power is exercised on behalf of an individual or
collective. The first complicating issue is whether the Security
Council is intended to be a representative body that exercises
discretionary power on behalf of some formation or iteration of the
global public. Though the Security Council clearly exercises broad
discretionary power,172 the notion that its power is exercised on a
representative basis or in a representative fashion cannot simply be
assumed. Indeed, the drafters of the Charter “explicitly rejected the
notion that the Security Council should be representative, democratic, or equitable.”173
This originalist interpretation by the drafters of the Charter is
not determinative of the position. However, the drafting history,
text, and subsequent practice reflect possible alternative interpretations of the foundations of Council authority (beyond its representative authority) that we must factor into any consideration of the
extent to which the Council’s power can be said to be fiduciary.
According to one interpretation, the Security Council framework
serves not to displace power politics, but to institutionalize it.174 The
decision at the end of the Second World War to grant certain states
(hitherto the “Great Powers”) both permanent membership in the
Council and a veto over decision-making sought to establish a
balance of power as the underpinning of the collective security
framework.175 As the New York Times reported it at the time of the
San Francisco Conference at which the U.N. Charter was drafted,

I.C.J. 47, ¶ 160 (Feb. 26); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 94 (July 9).
171. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
172. See Devika Hovell, Glasnost in the Security Council: The Value of Transparency, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UN SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 194, 202 (Larissa Van den
Herik ed., 2017).
173. Edward C. Luck, The U.N. Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?, in IRRELEVANT OR
INDISPENSABLE? THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 143, 144 (Paul
Heinbecker & Patricia Goff eds., 2005).
174. HURD, supra note 149, at 133.
175. See Hovell, supra note 172, at 206-07.
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“[m]ost countries ... ‘reluctantly accepted the idea of a virtual world
dictatorship by the great powers.’”176
Martin Wight accordingly speaks of “the sardonic smile of Hobbes
[visible] between the lines of the Charter.”177 Though Hobbes’
writings have been invoked by Evan Fox-Decent in public fiduciary
theory in support of the idea that sovereignty arises from public
trust,178 the Hobbesian dilemma is more frequently characterized as
an exchange of absolute freedom for absolute sovereignty arising
from the need for security.179 Indeed, “[t]he choice facing the drafters
of the U.N. Charter in 1945” in their quest for international peace
and security “has been described as a true Hobbesian dilemma,
presenting a choice between two unsavory options of maximizing
freedom and equality of states (risking potential anarchy), or
concentrating power in the hands of a single authority (risking
tyranny).”180 The solution was to merge recognition of sovereign
equality with a privileged status for the Permanent Five (P5) in
what Gerry Simpson has described as a “legalised hegemony,”181
harnessing the P5 to a multilateral framework in which they could
protect their fundamental interests.182 Koskenniemi describes the
Hobbesian dilemma as a continuing one:
[t]he unlimited nature of the language of Article 39 [of the U.N.
Charter], coupled with the ... virtual impossibility of judicially
challenging any determination under Article 39 do suggest an
image of the Council as a post-Cold War Leviathan; not only as
police but as judge, or perhaps a priest, of a new world order.183
176. DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 37 (2009) (quoting Russell Porter, Small Countries Gain a
Wider Role: Numerical Status Is Evident as Working Committees Begin Parley Tasks, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1945, at 10).
177. Martin Wight, An Anatomy of International Thought, 13 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 223
(1987).
178. See, e.g., Fox-Decent, supra note 43, at 183.
179. Robert O. Keohane, Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics:
Sovereignty in International Society, in WHOSE WORLD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND
THE END OF THE COLD WAR 165, 168 (Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sorensen eds., 1995).
180. Hovell, supra note 172, at 206 (citing Keohane, supra note 179, at 165-87).
181. Id. (citing GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 68 (2004)).
182. IAN CLARK, HEGEMONY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 150, 155 (2011).
183. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (2011) (footnotes
omitted).
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Some argue that the Hobbesian element, if anything, has become
more concentrated, with the P5 hegemony reduced to the power of
one and the role of the Council reduced to “an after-sales service
provider to US-led military interventions.”184
Yet the idea that the Council serves merely to launder the P5’s (or
the United States’) vision of world order without reference to the
broader membership is overstated. Even considering the framework
adopted in 1945, the plans for a Great Power dominion fell short.185
At the San Francisco Conference, the idea of a privileged status for
the Great Powers was the subject of criticism by medium and
smaller powers.186 “Indeed, in the course of ... negotiations, responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security shifted ... from the
executive to the plenary organ” and back again when the decision
was finally made to vest primary responsibility in the Security
Council.187 The Charter text reflects the final decision as a trade-off
between representation and effectiveness, rather than between
representation and Great Power interests.188 Article 24 confers
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security” on the Security Council “[i]n order to ensure prompt
and effective action by the United Nations.”189 The chosen voting
formula, including the veto, was explained by a member of the
Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference as stemming from the
practical necessity of guaranteeing military weight behind Council
decision-making, “devised to bring the bulk of the military forces
automatically behind the Council’s decisions and at the same time

184. RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY 209 (2006). On U.S.
dominance in the Council framework, see also David M. Malone, Introduction to THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 8 (David M. Malone ed.,
2004); ADAM ROBERTS & DOMINIK ZAUM, SELECTIVE SECURITY: WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1945, at 20 (2008); Peter Wallensteen & Patrik Johansson, Security
Council Decisions in Perspective, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE
21ST CENTURY, supra, at 17, 20; BRIAN FREDERKING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL: COLLECTIVE SECURITY SINCE THE COLD WAR 20 (2007); Ian Johnstone, The Security
Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
AUTHORITY 80, 102 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008).
185. Hovell, supra note 172, at 207.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 166, at 763-64).
188. Id.
189. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
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to give scope for the operation of checks and balances on the part of
the elected representatives of all the United Nations.”190
Further, it seems that representation was always intended to be
a limit on the license granted to secure efficiency and military
resources. Significantly, Article 24 reflects the agreement by the
founding member states that the Council, “in carrying out its duties
... acts on their behalf.”191 Anne Peters, in her commentary to Article
24, notes that “the concept of ‘responsibility’” vested in the Council
by the U.N. Charter “implies a ‘position of trust,’” and of authority
held on behalf of the “trust givers.”192 If anything, the scales have
increasingly tilted in favor of more representative decision-making.
The General Assembly has recognized the concept of hegemonism
“global and regional, in all its different forms” as “a serious threat
to international peace and security.”193 In 1992, Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked that the “power of principles” was
progressively “transcending changing perceptions of expediency.”194
In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali cautioned that if there
was a perception that the Charter’s principles were being applied
selectively, “trust will wane and with it the moral authority which
is the [Charter’s] greatest and most unique quality.”195
Yet the need for a balance between representation and effectiveness remains. In practice, effective action through the Security
Council continues to depend on the decision of the most powerful
states (including members of the P5) to contribute military resources and “pay the bill for almost all the executive activity,”
applying invariably their own national criteria.196 However, the
Council’s effectiveness depends equally on perceptions of the legitimacy of its mandate, which must broadly represent the will of the
190. Dwight E. Lee, The Genesis of the Veto, 1 INT’L ORG. 33, 34 (1947).
191. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
192. Peters, supra note 166, ¶¶ 11, 41.
193. G.A. Res. 34/103, Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International
Relations, at 19 (Dec. 14, 1979).
194. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (Jan. 31, 1992).
195. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
196. Jeremy Greenstock, The Security Council in the Post-Cold War World, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 248, 250 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); see also
Laura Neack, UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?, 32 J. PEACE RSCH. 181,
181 (1995).
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broader international community and promote shared goals and
values.197 The relationship between the P5 and broader U.N.
membership approximates one of “complex interdependence,” drawing on Keohane and Nye’s model for international order.198 Keohane
and Nye note the importance of legitimacy in situations in which the
coercive element is diminished, entailing the need for leading states
to “forgo short-run gains in bargaining” if they wish “to secure the
long-run gains associated with stable [bargaining] regimes” and
noting that this may “not confer special material benefits, although
it may carry high status as well as the ability to shape the agenda
for interstate discussions.”199 In similar terms, Ian Clark describes
the effectiveness of Council action as predicated on “a complex, and
volatile, balance of legitimation,” requiring the Council to achieve
in its decision-making an equilibrium between the interests of the
P5 and the interests of the global public.200 If the P5 wish to benefit
from the authority and status that the Council confers, as well as
from the “risk- and burden-sharing” it offers, it is in their interests
to seek to preserve the Council’s authority and ensure that correlation between Council action and P5 interests is not too overt.201 If
Council decision-making loses its “international sheen” and starts
to “look more like big-power bullying,” the Council and its permanent members both stand to be relatively disempowered as a
result.202
By way of resolution, the Council can be said to operate at a level
of second-order representation. By this, I mean that, while the
Council’s decisions do not themselves need to be representative,
they must clearly be taken in fulfillment of public (or representative) purposes. For reasons related to its effectiveness, the Council
is given broad discretion as to the measures it decides to take in
197. See CLARK, supra note 182, at 155; Caron, supra note 149, at 560; THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 221 (1998).
198. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 20-21 (4th ed.
2012); ANTONIOS TZANAKOPOULOS, DISOBEYING THE SECURITY COUNCIL 202-03 (2011); Ian
Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions 1992-2003,
59 INT’L ORG. 495, 523 (2005).
199. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 198, at 265.
200. CLARK, supra note 182, at 155.
201. Nico Krisch, The Security Council and the Great Powers, in UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 196, at 133, 144.
202. Open the Club, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1992, at 10.
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fulfilling its mandate.203 However, the mandate is a public one, in
the sense that the purpose or purposes for which action is taken
must reflect public purposes.204 As I have framed the fiduciary
relationship in the public sphere, institutional actors assume
authority based on an undertaking that they will exercise that
authority in pursuit of public purposes, giving rise to a legitimate
expectation in the public that this undertaking will be fulfilled.205 It
follows that the question of purpose is not one that can be determined subjectively by one or more members of the Council but must
accord with the relevant public’s legitimate expectation.
The question then becomes who may authoritatively frame and
formulate an understanding of the Council’s mandate or the purposes in pursuit of which it may legitimately act. This is a critical
and difficult question, and there are opposing views as to whether
the directive in Article 24—that the Council acts on behalf of
“Members”—renders it accountable to individual member states, to
the General Assembly, to “We the peoples,” or to some other
iteration of the global public more broadly.206 My position is that the
better view is that the source of the public will is to be found, not in
the views of any individual member state or in any amorphous
conception of the international community but in the General
Assembly. The will of the United Nations considered as a whole is
separate in an important sense from the will of individual states,
such that the Council is rightly construed as exercising a form of
“public authority” rather than one delegated by individual states.207
The United Nations is autonomous from its member states, possessing separate personality, rights, and duties on the international
203. Prosecutor v. Tadiþ, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
204. See CLARK, supra note 182, at 155; Caron, supra note 149, at 560; FRANCK, supra note
197, at 221.
205. See supra Part II.A.
206. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1; see Peters, supra note 166, ¶¶ 41-47; KOSKENNIEMI, supra
note 183, at 109; TZANAKOPOULOS, supra note 198, at 13; DAN SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 26-31 (1999); Erik Suy, The Role of the
United Nations General Assembly, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
55, 59 (Hazel Fox ed., 1997); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 275 (2000).
207. Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann & Ingo Venzke, From Public International
to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public
Authority, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 115, 116-17 (2017); Peters, supra note 166, ¶ 43.
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plane.208 The General Assembly’s exclusive control over the U.N.
budget209 and the Council’s reporting requirement to the General
Assembly under Article 24(3) lend support to the idea that the
Assembly is the rightful recipient of the Council’s accounts.210 The
principal or beneficiary of the Council is therefore appropriately
construed as the Organization itself, held accountable through “the
Plenary organ in which [all Member States] are represented,”
namely the General Assembly.211
2. Protected Interests
The fiduciary construct is uniquely suited to this context of
second-order representation. As discussed above, in circumstances
in which a public authority is required to act in the collective
interest, fiduciary responsibility is not judged by reference to the
interests of its beneficiaries but rather by reference to fulfillment of
public purposes. In the Security Council context, the question
accordingly becomes whether it is possible to identify a set of
purposes by which the Council’s conduct can be measured in
fiduciary terms.
The broad purpose of the Security Council is framed in Article 24
of the U.N. Charter as “primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security” of the U.N. Charter.212 The
Council’s specific functions are set out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and
XII, with its mandatory functions contained in Article 39, requiring
the Security Council: (1) to “determine the existence of any threat
208. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
209. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 162
(July 20).
210. Peters, supra note 166. While Article 24(3) merely states that reports are submitted
“for [the] consideration” of the General Assembly, state responses to such reports in the
General Assembly have led to increasing demands for the reports to be more analytical and
to “highlight the specific challenges faced by the Security Council, especially when it has
failed to act or has been divided.” U.N. Charter art. 24 ¶ 3; LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS,
THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 589 (4th ed. 2014). The reporting requirement
was referred to by the ICTY as one of the “constitutional limitations” on the Security Council.
Prosecutor v. Tadiþ, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
211. Peters, supra note 166, ¶¶ 43, 45.
212. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
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to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and (2) to
“decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”213
An understanding of the Security Council’s legal mandate is
therefore tied closely to understanding the circumstances in which
the Council’s responsibility is triggered (“threat to the peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression”) together with an understanding
of the scope of measures that can be said to fulfill its responsibility
to maintain or restore international peace and security.214
It is clear the Council is granted broad discretion in both
respects.215 Indeed, the broad parameters of the Charter text, and
lack of certainty regarding its limits, has led Bart Szewczyk to
conclude that “the primary problem of the Council ... is not insufficient resources or inadequate representativeness, but a lack of
agreement as to its purpose.”216 On the other hand, Nathaniel
Berman highlights the importance of pluralism in responding to
conflicts, cautioning that “[i]nternational law’s strength ... does not
depend on the provision of ‘clear mandates.’”217 Berman notes that,
on the contrary, international law’s resilience “depends on complex,
heterogeneously composed mandates—and on the presence of an
agile and legitimate [interpreter] of those mandates, able to use the
conflicts between the elements of the international regime as a
resource for responding to changing or previously misunderstood
features of the situation.”218 Taking a similar perspective, Koskenniemi posits that the place of law in collective security is in “opening
conceptions and practices of ‘security’ to public debate, and by

213. Id. art. 39. For greater detail on the interpretation of these provisions, see generally
Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 166, at 1237.
214. Krisch, supra note 213, ¶ 12.
215. Yet it is also now more commonly accepted that this discretion does not amount to
“absolute fiat” and that “neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security
Council as legibus solutus.” Tadiþ, no. IT-94-1-l, ¶ 28.
216. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Variable Multipolarity and U.N. Security Council Reform, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. 449, 451 (2012).
217. Nathaniel Berman, Intervention in a ‘Divided World’: Axes of Legitimacy, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 743, 753 (2006).
218. Id. at 753-54.
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enhancing the accountability of governmental and international
institutions for what goes on under the label of ‘security policy.’”219
Consistent with the notion of second-order representation, an
understanding of the purposes for which the Security Council’s
authority is exercised “can only be gleaned through a degree of
reflexivity to the public on whose behalf [it] performs its functions.”220 Therefore, “[t]he ‘shared values’ and ‘common interests’ of
the international community” will necessarily be the “subject [of]
continual rethinking and reinvention.”221 They “can only be gleaned
through ongoing, principled, factually informed deliberation about
these ‘terms’ of accountability.”222 The representative and purposive
elements must therefore work hand in hand to determine the scope
of any fiduciary relationship in the Security Council context. The
appropriate site for determination of the Security Council’s proper
purpose, and the appropriate forum within which to determine its
compliance with its fiduciary obligations, is by reference to the will
of the broader membership of the United Nations as reflected in the
General Assembly.223
3. Fiduciary Obligations
The real test as to the value of the fiduciary construct in the
Security Council context is whether it is possible to convert the
construct into identifiable obligations. As discussed in relation to
the domestic sphere, at the heart of fiduciary law and theory is (or
should be) the idea that those exercising discretionary authority on
behalf of others do not exploit or squander that authority.224 The
twin duties this gives rise to are duty of loyalty to purpose (or duty
of nonexploitation) and duty of care (or duty of due performance).225

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 111.
Hovell, supra note 172, at 203.
Id.
Id. at 205.
Peters, supra note 166, ¶¶ 43, 45.
See supra Part I.C.
See generally supra Part II.B.3.
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i. Duty of Nonexploitation
As Birks states in the domestic context, the term “loyalty” is
unhelpful as it “conveys no idea of the way in which or the purposes
for which a trustee is to be relied upon.”226 This is all the more so
when the duty is applied to the context of public governance, in
which it is anathema to describe those in positions of public authority as loyal to a particular beneficiary or a set of beneficiaries.227 To
the extent the Council and its officials must be loyal, it is to the
purposes for which authority is vested.228 At a minimum, according
to the fiduciary analogy, this requires that the Council and its
agents must not use the authority vested in them for direct personal
gain or unauthorized profit, that is, directly and personally to profit
from or to obtain direct personal profit for a third party.229 I have
argued above that the essence of this fiduciary duty is nonexploitation, and it may be more helpful to recognize any related
duty in the Security Council context by that name.
The duty of nonexploitation does not require separate international legal foundation and can be seen as following from recognized
principles of international law, including principles of good faith and
abuse of right. The principle of good faith is well recognized as a
general principle of international law.230 It can moreover be regarded as a constitutional principle of the Charter, included in
Article 2 of the Charter which sets out the principles in accordance
with which the Organization and its Members are required to act.231
Birks, supra note 13, at 11-12.
See, e.g., supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra Part II.B.3.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See CHENG, supra note 157, at 105-160; J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107, 107-09 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM,
POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 106-26 (1999); Robert Kolb, La Bonne Foi en Droit
International Public, 31 R.B.D.I. 661, 661, 674-732 (1998); Michael Virally, Review Essay,
Good Faith in Public International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 130, 133 (1983); M. Lachs, Some
Thoughts on the Role of Good Faith in International Relations, in DECLARATIONS ON
PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 47-55 (Robert J. Akkerman et al. eds., 1977);
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, in 87 RECUEIL DES
COURS 290-326 (1955); A. Verdross, La Bonne Foi Comme Fondement du Droit International
Public, in 5 REVUE HELLÉNIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 17-21 (1952).
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 2.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
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Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter provides that all Members “shall
fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.”232 In interpreting this principle, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has deployed the criteria of
relationship to purpose as a yardstick for deciding what good faith
requires in any particular case.233
While the principle of good faith can admittedly seem abstract, it
serves as a juridical foundation based upon which more precise legal
obligations can be concretized. In the context of international organizations, it has been described as having “the function of assuring
the primacy of common aims over manifestations of excessive
individualism by States which are incompatible with them.”234 One
principle that has developed out of the overriding obligation of good
faith is that of the prohibition of abuse of right, which has been
recognized as a general principle of international law.235 As Hersch
Lauterpacht describes it,
[t]he essence of the doctrine is that ... the exercise of a hitherto
legal right becomes unlawful when it degenerates into an abuse
of rights; [which will occur when] the general interest of the
community is injuriously affected as the result of the sacrifice of
an important social ... interest to a less important, though
hitherto legally recognized, individual right.236

According to this principle, states are required “not to exercise a
right beyond the limits of what was reasonable.”237 Bin Cheng
elaborated that a

232. Id.
233. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 91-93 (May 28) (dissenting opinion by Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair,
and Read, JJ.); see also id. at 103 (dissenting opinion by ZoriĀiþ, J.); id. at 115 (dissenting
opinion by Krylov, J.).
234. Robert Kolb, Chapter 1 Purposes and Principles, Article 2(2), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 166, at 174, § 21.
235. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 158, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
236. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286
(1933).
237. Summary Records of the Twenty-Second Session, [1970] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 222,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970.
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reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right implies an exercise
which is genuinely in pursuit of those interests which the right
is destined to protect and which is not calculated to cause any
unfair prejudice to the legitimate interests of another State,
whether these interests be secured by treaty or by general
international law.238

Principles such as good faith and abuse of right serve as legal
markers for conduct that oversteps what can otherwise be an
“imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, [or] between
discretion and arbitrariness.”239 The duty of nonexploitation,
constraining Security Council members, agents and officials from
deploying their authority in their personal rather than public
interest, is in the same mold. Wolfgang Friedmann and Vaughan
Lowe have both discussed the way in which principles of equity can
be deployed to encourage the development of more precise principles
that can serve to materially alter “the whole character of international law and its relation to the most pressing problems of fairness
and justice.”240 Lauterpacht cautioned against a “too rigidly
positivistic interpretation of [international law’s] sources” or “a
sweeping condemnation of beneficent principles forming part of the
common stock of legal science on the ground” merely because they
“have not secured explicit acceptance by States.”241 Against this
backdrop, a fiduciary duty of nonexploitation can be seen as a fairly
uncontroversial offshoot of established principles.

238. CHENG, supra note 157, at 131.
239. Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning Territory
of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 120 (June 7) (separate opinion by
Lauterpacht, J.).
240. Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm
Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 207, 218 (Michael Byers
ed., 2000); see also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of “General Principles” in the Development
of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 289-90 (1963); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 236, at
313-14; Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389,
429-30 (2002).
241. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 236, at 298-99.
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ii. Duty of Due Performance
While the duty of nonexploitation addresses abuse of authority,
the fiduciary duty of care would take the more controversial step of
assessing failure by the Council to exercise its authority effectively.
The fiduciary duty of care might be described as a duty of due
performance, which entails within it both (1) a duty to perform the
institutional mandate and (2) a duty to exercise care, skill and
diligence in doing so.242
Recognition of a duty of due performance entails within it the
controversial idea that, in certain circumstances, the Security
Council may incur liability for failure to act. As discussed in relation
to the domestic context, there is no general agreement between legal
systems (or even within some systems) as to whether prescriptive
obligations such as a duty of care or duty of due performance should
be an aspect of the fiduciary construct.243 In considering the
application of such an obligation in the international sphere, there
is good reason for caution. José Alvarez described the idea of the
U.N.’s legal responsibility for failing to act (including in response to
the Rwandan genocide) as “absurdly premature and not likely to be
affirmed by state practice.”244
However, for scholars including David Caron, recognition that the
Council owes a duty of due performance is not controversial: “The
failure of an institution to govern out of inability to use its authority, particularly an institution that represents or aspires to represent a system of order, has long been a basis for alleging that the
order is illegitimate because it fails to perform its basic mission.”245
It is clear that such a duty was at least contemplated by the drafters
of the U.N. Charter, including by the permanent members.246 The
242. Cf. supra Part I.C.2.
243. See supra Part I.C.2.
244. José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND
THE USE OF FORCE 275, 282 (Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald eds., 2008).
245. Caron, supra note 149, at 560-61.
246. The drafters of the U.N. Charter explained that, following investigation of a situation
or dispute, “the Council must determine whether [its] continuance ... would be likely to
endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under
obligation to take further steps.” U.N. Conference on International Organization, Statement
by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security
Council, ¶ 5, UNCIO Doc. 852, 111/1/37(1), 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 710-14 annex IV (June 8,
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text of Article 24, in particular the use of the terminology of
“responsibility,” has been interpreted as implicating more than
authority but rather a duty to “fulfil that task and discharge that
function properly.”247 This view is further corroborated by reference
to the Council’s “duties under this responsibility” in Article 24(1).248
Beyond the drafting history and text of the Charter, the fiduciary
duty of due performance finds reflection in other principles of
international law. Scholars supporting the existence of a positive
duty upon the Council to act tend to locate this duty in existing
interstate duties under international law—for example, in duties to
respect, to prevent, not to obstruct protective measures and to
assist.249 Yet such duties are not numerous and tend to apply only
in limited circumstances. One of the only treaties to recognize a
positive obligation on third-party states to prevent conduct that
would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security
is the Genocide Convention.250 Under Article I of the convention,
state parties “undertake to prevent and punish” genocide,251 an
undertaking that the ICJ has interpreted as more than merely
hortatory. According to the ICJ’s interpretation, the extent of a
state’s duty depends on its “capacity to influence” the main actors
in the events, and a violation will be found only when the state
“manifestly failed to take all measures” that were “within its power”
to take.252 The International Law Commission (ILC) recognized a
1945) (emphasis added). They acknowledged this to be a course of action “from which the
Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities.”
Id.
247. Peters, supra note 166, ¶ 13.
248. See U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
249. See generally Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect,
39 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 267-80 (2014); Anne Peters, The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling Out
the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members, in FROM
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST 297, 309 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011); Louise
Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice, 34
REV. INT’L STUD. 445 (2008).
250. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Humanity, with Commentaries, arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 47, 54 (2019).
251. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec.
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. In addition, “[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon
the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter ... as they
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” Id. art. 8.
252. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 47, ¶ 430 (Feb. 26).
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broader duty upon states to “cooperate to bring to an end through
lawful means any serious breach” by a state of an obligation arising
under a peremptory norm in Article 41 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.253 However, the
ILC acknowledges in its commentary that this Article reflects a
“progressive development of international law” rather than a statement of existing law.254 The problem with relying on such obligations as the foundation for the Council’s duty to perform its
mandate is that the result would be somewhat piecemeal (arguably
applicable only in the case of genocide) and would be open to the
“plausible” objection that such obligations do not in any event apply
to international organizations.255
In responding to some of these problems, Jan Klabbers has
proposed recognition of a concept of “role responsibility,” finding a
positive duty to act connected to an international organization’s
mandate.256 Yet Klabbers acknowledges that “the generic notion of
responsibility employed ... will need some adaptation before it can
be turned into a workable administrative law device.”257 Another
relevant principle of note is the principle of due diligence, which is
receiving increasing attention in international law scholarship.258
Heike Krieger and Anne Peters detail how the principle of due
diligence has expanded beyond the traditional no harm principle
(which seeks to prevent negligent or reckless conduct that would
cause reasonably foreseeable harm to others) to a duty to act
diligently to prevent harm and even potentially to take all appropriate means to achieve goal-oriented obligations, while acknowledging
253. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 41, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 113 (2001) [hereinafter
ARSIWA]. Note that the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
contains a similar clause, though this applies to the duty to prevent international
organizations from violating peremptory norms. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations, art. 42, U.N. Doc A/66/10, at 10 (2011).
254. ARSIWA, supra note 253, at 114.
255. See Jan Klabbers, Reflections on Role Responsibility: The Responsibility of
International Organizations for Failing to Act, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1133, 1136 (2017).
256. See id. at 1154.
257. Id. at 1160.
258. See generally Ellen Campbell, Elizabeth Dominic, Snezhana Stadnik & Yuanzhou Wu,
Note, Due Diligence Obligations of International Organizations Under International Law, 50
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 541 (2018); Neil McDonald, The Role of Due Diligence in
International Law, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1041 (2019).
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that due diligence may mean different things in different contexts.259
However, Krieger and Peters detail a number of problems with
recognition of due diligence as a general legal principle that might
apply equally to any fiduciary duty of due performance. In both
cases, the term due purports to disguise within a legal formula a
dynamic value judgment, influenced by shifting “social, political and
ethical considerations.”260 The problem with such an indeterminate
formula is that it becomes very difficult “to gauge in advance and
ascertain after the fact whether a due diligence standard has been
breached or not.”261 The difference in the domestic sphere of operation is that the relevant fiduciary duty of care has been fleshed out
through the development of professional and industrial standards
applicable in particular contexts. As Krieger and Peters note,
“[s]uch standards are often crucial for determining which conduct
is actually ‘due’ in a given issue area, and they heavily influence the
interpretation of the relevant hard law.”262 In the international
context, and even more the Security Council context, few such
standards exist.
However, all is not lost in terms of the recognition of such a duty
in the Security Council context. The qualification is that, in this
space of broad discretion and legal indeterminacy, the duty of due
performance is arguably more appropriately achieved through the
application of procedural rather than substantive standards.
Ultimately, the question of due performance is something to be
judged against the legitimate expectation of the relevant community. The question as to whether the expectation has been met can
be resolved only by reference to that community. Specifically in
terms of the Council’s mandate, the relevant community expectations must be fleshed out by the General Assembly.263
The fiduciary construct in this way imposes an obligation on the
Council to be responsive to the General Assembly’s expectations, as
reflected in its treaties, resolutions, reports, and debate, and
259. See Heike Krieger & Anne Peters, Due Diligence and Structural Change in the
International Legal Order, in DUE DILIGENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 351, 352
(Heike Krieger et al. eds., 2020).
260. Id. at 380-81.
261. Id. at 387.
262. Id. at 388.
263. See supra Part III.B.1.
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arguably for the General Assembly to be proactive in generating
minimum standards and holding the Council to account when it
falls short of these expectations. Of particular significance in this
regard is the recognition of a responsibility to protect in the 2005
World Summit Outcome document adopted by the General Assembly. The document provides that, when national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, “[t]he
international community, through the United Nations, ... has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and
other peaceful means ... to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”
and is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council ... should peaceful means be
inadequate.”264 Here, the Assembly indicates a responsibility on the
U.N., including the Security Council, to act in specified situations
of mass atrocity.265
The overall argument is that the Council’s duty of due performance is not a matter of objective assessment in any particular case
by any third-party arbitrator. Instead, the fiduciary construct opens
up a framework for dialectical engagement between the Security
Council and the General Assembly. The best method for assessing
compliance with fiduciary duties in the Security Council context is
through devising a set of procedural obligations to generate and
guide informed deliberation within the General Assembly against
the applicable standards.
iii. Subsidiary Duties: A Set of Procedural Obligations
Alleged violations of the duty of nonexploitation and duty of due
performance will rarely if ever be the subject of judicial determination in the Security Council context. The significance of the
recognition of this constitutional construct is predominantly
political rather than legal. The operative dimension of the construct
will be on the legitimacy rather than legality of the Council, with

264. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 2005).
265. See id.
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repercussions being felt in terms of the reduction of its authority
rather than the expansion of its liability.266
In this context, the subsidiary duties assume particular importance in providing a means to evidence and assess the scope of the
Council’s compliance with the relevant duties and to thereby impact
the legitimacy of and trust in the Council. These duties include:
(1) duty to notify (including by disclosing or declaring any self or
third-party interests), (2) duty to inform, (3) duty to consult, (4) duty
to give reasons, and (5) duty to account.267 Without detracting from
their significance, there is not enough scope in this paper to provide
greater detail on these subsidiary duties, though others have done
so in recognition of their broader contribution to the legitimacy of
the Council’s decision-making processes.268
IV. CASE STUDIES
Beyond a broad elaboration of the construct, it remains to be seen
whether the fiduciary construct can be helpfully applied to regulate
action by the Security Council, its agents and officials in particular
circumstances. In this Part, I consider four situations that have
been construed as a “betrayal of trust”269 by the Council and its
subsidiary organs in order to ascertain whether the fiduciary
construct—either in its contractual or constitutional form—might
apply to provide appropriate limits to the action of the Council, its
agents, or officials. Sections A and B consider application of the
contractual principle in relation to both the U.N. Interim Administration in Kosovo’s privatization of public assets and to sexual
exploitation by U.N. peacekeepers. Sections C and D consider the
application of the constitutional principle to the use of the veto in
266. Cf., e.g., notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
267. Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 77, at 44, 53-55 (describing these subsidiary fiduciary duties
in the context of trust law); see also Daniel Moeckli & Raffael N. Fasel, A Duty to Give
Reasons in the Security Council: Making Voting Transparent, 14 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 13, 15
(2017).
268. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Anna Spain, The U.N.
Security Council’s Duty to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 320 (2013); Moeckli & Fasel, supra
note 267, at 15; Nahuel Maisley, The International Right of Rights? Article 25(a) of the ICCPR
as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 89 (2017).
269. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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situations of atrocity and to due process failures in sanctions
decision-making. This exercise serves to highlight a number of
problems in applying the fiduciary construct in the Council context,
helping to determine appropriate limits and qualifications to its
application.
A. Privatization of Public Assets in Kosovo: The Private/Public
Problem
The exemplar fiduciary relationship is that of the trustee who
undertakes to deal with the proprietary or economic interests of the
beneficiary.270 Only rarely can the Security Council, its agents, and
officials be said to undertake such a role. Yet, one area in which the
potential does arise is international territorial administration.
The issue of the U.N.’s fiduciary obligations specifically arose in
relation to the privatization of public assets by the U.N. Interim
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). In June 1999, following
NATO’s military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Security Council vested UNMIK with “[a]ll legislative and
executive authority with respect to Kosovo,”271 including “the
reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction.”272 After elections were held and a provisional government took
office in 2001, the power to administer public, state, and socially
owned property was reserved to UNMIK.273
The question of property rights in Kosovo was characterized by
great uncertainty.274 Under the former Yugoslav system, the concept
of “[s]ocial ownership meant that no particular individual or
institution had property rights,” which were instead owned by
“society as a whole.”275 “The entity that exercised ownership rights
270. Edelman, supra note 33, at 304; Sitkoff, supra note 33, at 41.
271. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, §1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999).
272. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11(g) (June 10, 1999).
273. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, ¶ 8.1(q), U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15,
2001).
274. I am indebted to Dominik Zaum, who alerted me to this case study. See DOMINIK
ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
STATEBUILDING 154-55 (2007).
275. Id. at 154.

1282

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1229

on behalf of society was the state, and in particular the respective
municipalities, who had the original right to allocate land and
assets under social ownership for use.”276 Dominik Zaum explains:
Throughout the 1990s, enterprises in Kosovo were privatized
under Yugoslav and Serbian legislation and sold to international
investors, bought out by workers, or merged with Serbian
companies.... [T]hese mergers were often involuntary, and the
Kosovar companies effectively became wholly owned subsidiaries
of Serbian companies[, with assets] frequently siphoned-off to
Serbia.... UNMIK’s decision in December 1999 to change the
applicable law in Kosovo to the law applied prior to 23 March
1989 had ... [the] effect[ ] [of] declar[ing] ... later privatization
laws invalid. As a consequence, ... the concept of social ownership [was reintroduced,] ... rais[ing] the question whether any
property transactions conducted under the old laws were
retroactively invalidated.277

Under Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK was mandated
to restructure Kosovo’s public economy; however, U.N. legal
advisers interpreted the resolution “as prohibiting UNMIK from
making any lasting change[ ] to the ownership status of sociallyowned enterprises (SOEs) which [might] prejudice the rights of
former owners or claimants.”278 This led to a dispute between
UNMIK’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the U.N. legal adviser in
New York (UNLA), and UNMIK’s European Union component (EU
component) over the fiduciary duty owed in this case.279 In particular, the dispute focused on the question as to “who[ ] UNMIK, as a
trustee, ha[d] responsibilities [toward]: the owners of SOEs, or the
population of Kosovo?”280 The OLA and UNLA “insisted that the
administration mandate of UNMIK meant that it was the trustee
for [the] SOE owners, and [therefore] had a responsibility not to sell
assets to which they had a right.”281 However, the EU component
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
55.
281.

Id.
Id. at 155 (footnotes omitted).
Knoll, supra note 17, at 651.
Id. at 653-54.
ZAUM, supra note 274, at 159 (footnote omitted); see also Knoll, supra note 17, at 651ZAUM, supra note 274, at 159.
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“conceived [UNMIK’s] trustee obligations as primarily directed
toward” Kosovar society and “the territory’s economic recovery,”
arguing that privatization was necessary to fulfill UNMIK’s role as
trustee.282 UNMIK’s “capacity to transfer property rights and
allocate land and assets [was] resolved with the creation of [an
independent authority,] the Kosovo Trust Agency[,] ... vested with
the right to initiate privatization” of socially owned enterprises, and
a special chamber in the Kosovo Supreme Court, vested with the
power to resolve ownership disputes arising from privatization.283
The case highlights “the inherently contradictory sets of interests”
that international institutions administering territory are mandated
to serve.284 Zaum characterizes the problem as a conflict between
the U.N.’s legal and political fiduciary obligations.285 He describes
a tension between the legal and political conceptions of trusteeship,
in which the U.N. was required to choose between the danger of
legal liability if it failed to protect the legal beneficiaries or the
danger of losing political legitimacy if it failed to protect its political
beneficiaries (the Kosovar population).286 However, as I have argued
above, it is important not to conflate the legal and political fiduciary
constructs. As Nicole Roughan has noted, writing in the context of
state-indigenous fiduciary relations, there is nothing unusual about
public authorities assuming private obligations or burdens in the
course of exercising their public mandate.287 Yet, it is important to
differentiate the situation in which the U.N. acts as fiduciary for the
Kosovar population from the situation in which, acting as fiduciary
of public interests, the U.N. must consider the interests of private
parties. In the former case, according to Roughan’s construction, the
282. Knoll, supra note 17, at 653.
283. Id. at 652; see Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On the Establishment
of a Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related
Matters, ¶ 4.1(c), U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2002/13 (June 13, 2002). The issue was the subject
of legal proceedings in New York, but those proceedings were dismissed at the behest of the
plaintiff given the strength of forum non conveniens grounds due to the availability of a
specialized court in Kosovo with exclusive jurisdiction over privatization disputes. Wood
Indus., LLC v. United Nations, No. 1:03-cv-07935-GEL (S.D.N.Y. dismissed Sept. 29, 2006).
284. Knoll, supra note 17, at 651.
285. ZAUM, supra note 274, at 159.
286. Id. at 159-60.
287. Nicole Roughan, Public/Private Distortions and State-Indigenous Fiduciary
Relationships, 2019 N.Z. L. REV. 9, 34.
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U.N. is not a public office dealing with a private interest but more
in the nature of a private office dealing with a public interest.288 In
the latter case, the U.N. does not act “on behalf of” the private
parties concerned in the fiduciary sense but must consider these
private interests in the manner of a public authority. This case
study illustrates the difficulty, but also the importance, of identifying the relevant parties to a fiduciary relationship, and the nature
of that relationship (legal or political) in the context of international
governance.
B. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by U.N. Peacekeepers:
The Problem of Paternalism
The image of the U.N. peacekeeper has fallen from grace over the
last decade with over one thousand allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers recorded since 2007.289 In public
discourse, sexual exploitation and U.N. Peacekeeping are increasingly placed in an uncomfortable association.290 Restoration of trust
is at the heart of the U.N. response, both in terms of the trust of the
beneficiary population and the trust of the international community.291 The definition of “sexual exploitation” adopted by the
U.N. incorporates betrayal of trust as an element of the violation,
referring to “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but
not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the
sexual exploitation of another.”292 A 2017 General Assembly resolution on U.N. action on sexual exploitation and abuse stressed

288. See id. at 35.
289. U.N. Conduct in U.N. Field Missions, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Over Time, U.N.,
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-overview [https://perma.cc/8RUN-ALDC].
290. For some time now on the U.N. Peacekeeping homepage, the image hyperlink for general information about “peacekeeping operations” has been placed next to an image hyperlink
for information on “prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse.” U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en [https://perma.cc/T7EN-MFXE].
291. Devika Hovell, UNaccountable: A Reply to Rosa Freedman, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 987, 988
(2018).
292. U.N. Secretary-General, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, § 1, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9, 2003)
(emphasis added).
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further that accountability for such conduct is “critical ... for
maintaining the trust of the international community.”293
Though the U.N. is concerned above all with allegations of rape
and sexual abuse, the U.N. response clearly goes beyond the
repression of criminal conduct. The U.N. has publicly adopted a
“zero tolerance” policy and all individuals deployed to U.N. fieldbased activities must now carry a “No Excuse” card setting out the
rules relating to sexual exploitation and abuse.294 The “No Excuse”
card provides that “[i]t is strictly prohibited to have sex with
anyone, in exchange for money, employment, preferential treatment, goods or services, whether or not prostitution is legal in my
country or the host country.”295
How does the abuse and response sit in relation to the fiduciary
construct? Here, the contractual version of the principle arguably
comes into play, opening up the possibility for members of a beneficiary population to challenge the liability of the U.N. and its
peacekeepers for breach of fiduciary duty of nonexploitation. When
peacekeepers can be said to have used their authority for personal
benefit, including sexual gratification, this could be construed as a
violation of their fiduciary duty of nonexploitation. Institutional
accountability would follow if the U.N. was found to have failed to
prevent such conduct, protect potential victims, investigate allegations, or take remedial action against wrongdoers.296 Of course,
this is subject to the qualification that noneconomic interests are in
293. G.A. Res. 71/278, ¶ 3 (Mar. 20, 2017).
294. Press Release, United Nations, The ‘No Excuse’ Card Is Online and Ready to Be
Distributed (June 2, 2017), www.un.int/news/no-excuse-card-online-and-ready-be-distributed
[https://perma.cc/569Y-4ZEY].
295. No Excuse Card, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/
2-no_excuse_card-4pages-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZV78-7RAD]. See also the SecretaryGeneral’s Bulletin, which notes that “[s]exual relationships between United Nations staff and
beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics,
undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations and are strongly
discouraged.” U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 292, § 3.2(d).
296. Nigel D. White, Due Diligence, the U.N. and Peacekeeping, in DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 259, at 217, 218-20. White notes that the U.N.
Human Rights Committee determined that a state is required “to respect and ensure ... rights
to all persons ... within the power or effective control ... [of] a national contingent of a State
Party assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation,” though
made no comment in relation to U.N. liability. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31:
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004).
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some jurisdictions not recognized as protected interests under
fiduciary law. However, “a legal basis for institutional [fiduciary]
accountability” has been found “in cases relating to the sexual abuse
of Aboriginal children in Indian residential schools and sexual
misconduct by clergy against parishioners,”297 and for individual
accountability in the case of a doctor providing a prescription in
return for sexual favours.298
Yet the response to the issue of sexual exploitation also gives
insight into its paternalistic aspect. The fiduciary relationship is, as
Nicole Roughan has put it, “structured by and give[s] rise to
inequality between the parties.”299 We can either invoke the
fiduciary construct as part of “a sacred story of guardians bound to
the terms of a public trust” or recognize in it “a profane tale in
which some citizens dominate others.”300 An unthinking insertion of
the language and law of fiduciary and a trust conception of governance into the U.N. decision-making context raises the question as
to whether we have learned the lessons of international trusteeship,
associated as it has been historically with relationships of colonial
domination and imperialism.301 To construe the Security Council
and its officials and agents as fiduciary is to intersect with a far
broader historical narrative about “the relationship between
political elites and those subject to the public power they wield.”302
297. Hovell, supra note 291, at 993 (footnotes omitted); see also Blackwater v. Plint, [2005]
3 S.C.R. 3, para. 61 (Can.) (providing an example of a residential school case); Cloud v.
Canada, [2005] 73 O.R. 401, para. 12 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (same); Bonaparte v. Canada, [2003]
64 O.R. 3d 1, para. 21 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (same); Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Cath. Diocesan
Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 426-30 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering liability in the church context); Doe
v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 375 (Fla. 2002) (same).
298. See Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 239 (Can.).
299. Roughan, supra note 287, at 28.
300. Seth Davis, American Colonialism and Constitutional Redemption, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1751, 1789 (2017).
301. See generally on this point, Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereign Trusteeship and Empire,
16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 447 (2015); RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION: HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY (2008);
BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2007); ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE 276-303 (2001); SIBA N’ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS,
QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
148-56 (1996); KENNETH ROBINSON, THE DILEMMAS OF TRUSTEESHIP: ASPECTS OF BRITISH
COLONIAL POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS (1965).
302. Davis, supra note 300, at 1789.
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This history of domination carries important lessons about the
paternalistic and even infantilizing aspects of the fiduciary concept,
where it has the effect of divesting the beneficiary population of
their agency.303 Gina Heathcote cautions against the use of legal
structures that “reinforce negative stereotypes of the non-western
victim subject, to whom restricted agency and seemingly perpetual
vulnerability are attributed.”304 Where the fiduciary construct is
applied, its implicit effect may be to question the beneficiary population’s capacity for self-government.305 Any interpretation of the
fiduciary construct in the U.N. setting must navigate its potential
to prevent exploitation, but also to prevent self-determination. It is
critical that legal and political processes privilege participation in
decision-making processes by beneficiaries and beneficiary populations.
C. Exercise of the Veto and Failures to Protect: The Problem of
Pluralism
The veto power was the element that made agreement to the
establishment of the U.N. Security Council possible, but also
contains within it the seeds of the Council’s demise if enough actors
in the international community determine the Council does not adequately represent their will.306 The role of trust is in this way critical
to the Council’s effectiveness and endurance. However, the veto
right granted to the P5 also complicates any characterization of the
Council as fiduciary to the extent the construct is designed to
respond to a context of representative decision-making. In practice,
303. The duty of loyalty has been said to build an element of paternalism into every
fiduciary relation, requiring a fiduciary to act in a certain way even if a beneficiary might
prefer a different course of action. Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post:
The Non-contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 27, at 209, 217.
304. Gina Heathcote, Participation, Gender and Security, in RETHINKING PEACEKEEPING,
GENDER EQUALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 48, 50 (Gina Heathcote & Dianne Otto eds.,
2014).
305. Vanessa Pupavac, War on the Couch: The Emotionology of the New International
Security Paradigm, 7 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 149, 163 (2004).
306. Edward C. Luck, A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and
Its Relevance Today, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 196,
at 61, 75, 79-81.
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it is clear that the Council’s permanent members “use the veto to
defend their national interests, to uphold a tenet of their foreign
policy or, in some cases, to promote a single issue of particular
importance to a state.”307 It is not unheard of for the votes of nonpermanent members to be “bought” with permanent members
promising rewards or threats of punishment so as to influence
votes.308 Such practice might make us question whether we should
just accept Caron’s pessimistic characterization of the veto, concluding that “the potential to betray the promise is built directly and
tragically into the organization.”309
However, such practice is not determinative of the normative
position. It is clear that the vote buying and other self-interested
conduct is unjustifiable by reference either to law or legitimate
political expectations. Judges of the I.C.J. have recognized that, in
casting their votes in the U.N. context, states are “legally entitled
to [base their vote] ... on any political considerations which seem to
it to be relevant,”310 though their freedom is limited. Rather, states
are bound to exercise their powers in “good faith, to give effect to the
Purposes and Principles of the [Organization] and to act in such a
manner as not to involve any breach of the Charter.”311 From a legitimacy perspective, concerns about the unrepresentative nature
of the Security Council and its decision-making run deep and could
307. UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php
[https://perma.cc/7FUJ-JRYS].
308. Professor Weston discusses reports of U.S. promises of financial help to Colombia,
Côte D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Zaire and threats to cut off seventy million dollars in annual aid
to Yemen so as to influence the vote on Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force against
Iraq. See Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 523-25 (1991). For further scholarship
on vote buying, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, Aid: Blame It All on “Easy
Money,” 57 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 524, 528, 534-35 (2012); Natalie J. Lockwood, International
Vote Buying, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 97, 98, 103 (2013); Axel Dreher & James Raymond Vreeland,
Buying Votes and International Organizations 2-3, 7 (Georg August Univ. of Göttingen Ctr.
for Eur. Governance & Econ. Dev. Rsch., Working Paper No. 123), https://www.econstor.edu/
bitstream/10419/70233/1/661536777.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC7M-AQTM].
309. Caron, supra note 149, at 560.
310. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 92 (May 28) (dissenting opinion by Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair,
and Read, JJ.).
311. Id.; see also id. at 103 (dissenting opinion by ZoriĀiþ, J.); id. at 115 (dissenting opinion
by Krylov, J.).
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prove existential. The characterization of certain members of the P5
as “Great Powers” is an anachronism, and even that critique is
nothing new.312 Movements pushing for reform of the veto are
gaining momentum, particularly when a member of the P5 uses its
veto to block action in cases of genocide and large-scale human
rights abuse.313 The Accountability Coherence and Transparency
Group’s Code of Conduct, calling upon permanent members not to
veto any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass
atrocities, has 119 state signatories.314 Against this backdrop, certain permanent members publicly acknowledge that they cannot
afford to exploit or rest on their privileged status but must earn this
status by “making, and paying for, concrete and effective contribution[s]” to the maintenance of international peace and security.315
In these circumstances, trust can be regarded as a critical source
of the Council’s continuing legitimate authority, connected to the
need to offer at least second-order representation and to ensure any
discretion is exercised within the bounds of fulfilling representative
purposes. The fiduciary construct offers potential legal parameters
for the Council and its members to operate within, including in the
exercise of the veto.316 Applying the fiduciary construct, the exercise
312. See Strengthening the United Nations, THE ELDERS (Feb. 7, 2015), https://the
elders.org/sites/default/files/2015-04-22_elders-statement-strengthening-the-un.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YFP-QBGS].
313. See Permanent Rep. of Liech. to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 14, 2015 from the
Permanent Rep. of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/70/621-S/2015/978 (Dec. 14, 2015); Strengthening the United Nations, supra note
312; Permanent Reps. of Fr. & Mex., Political Declaration on the Suspension of Veto Powers
in Cases of Mass Atrocities (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/politicaldeclaration-on-suspension-of-veto-powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/ [https://perma.cc/7HGWA5SE]; Permanent Reps. of Switz., Costa Rica, Jordan, Liech. & Sing. to the U.N., Letter
dated Nov. 3, 2005 from the Permanent Reps. of Switzerland, Costa Rica, Jordan,
Liechtenstein & Singapore to the United Nations to all Permanent Representatives and
Permanent Observers of all Missions to the United Nations (Nov. 10, 2005), https://
www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Swiss_S5_Resolution_November_10_2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A66W-E245].
314. This includes 117 U.N. member states and two non-member state observers (Palestine
and Holy See). List of Signatories to the ACT Code of Conduct, GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESP. TO
PROTECT (June 20, 2019), https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/list-of-signatories-to-the-actcode-of-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/2SQ4-9858].
315. Greenstock, supra note 196, at 260; Laurent Fabius, A Call for Self-Restraint at the
U.N., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes. com/2013/10/04/opinion/a-call-for-selfrestraint-at-the-un.html [https://perma.cc/5V7R-T56Z].
316. As Trahan notes, one potential complication is that the threat of the veto (or even
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of the veto would constitute a violation of fiduciary duties when
(1) it was exercised out of self-interest or in the interest of third
parties and not for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security (violation of the duty of nonexploitation);317 (2) its
exercise was based on a lack of credible information (violation of the
duty of care and skill);318 or (3) it obstructed measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security in a way that impeded
performance of the Council’s role (violation of the duty of due
performance).319
How then would the fiduciary construct apply (or have applied)
if China vetoed a proposed arms embargo against Sudan in the
midst of a genocide because China did not want to jeopardize
Sudanese arms imports from China;320 if the United States used its
veto to prevent a resolution denouncing Israel;321 or if the United
States, France, or the U.K. vetoed a resolution recognizing the
killings in Rwanda as genocide because they lacked the will to
commit the military resources necessary to protect the population?322 Are permanent members entitled to use the veto to protect
economic interests, to protect third-party interests based on
diplomatic alliances, or out of a mere lack of political will? Each of
these examples could be interpreted as a violation of applicable
fiduciary duties of nonexploitation and due performance respectively.323 Yet, in understanding the impact of this determination, it
broad understanding of a permanent member’s political alignment) can serve to “block the
Security Council [sometimes] just as effectively as actual veto use.” Jennifer Trahan,
Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity Crimes, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L.
73, 77 (2020).
317. See supra Part III.B.3.i.
318. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part III.B.3.ii.
320. Press Release, Security Council, Head of Sudan Sanctions Committee Briefs Security
Council as Delegates Debate Criteria for Lifting 13-Year-Old Measures, Ongoing Sexual
Violence, U.N. Press Release SC/13668 (Jan. 17, 2019).
321. Rick Gladstone, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution on Gaza, Fails to Win Second Vote on Its
Own Measure, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/06/01/world/middleeast/
gaza-israel-palestinians-.html [https://perma.cc/PE37-9GDH].
322. Ariela Blätter & Paul D. Williams, The Responsibility Not to Veto, 3 GLOB. RESP. TO
PROTECT 301, 311 (2011); Colin Keating, Rwanda: An Insider’s Account, in THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 184, at 500, 509; Linda
Melvern & Paul Williams, Britannia Waived the Rules: The Major Government and the 1994
Rwandan Genocide, 103 AFR. AFFS. 1, 2, 5, 10-11 (2004).
323. See supra Part III.B.3.
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is necessary to engage with both the political and pluralist nature
of authority in this setting. The veto is a political decision that can
be exercised on the basis of political considerations.324 Yet this does
not mean permanent members should be permitted to cast the veto
into a political void.325 The role of fiduciary parameters is to place
trust more expressly in the ledger.326 Political authority exercised by
permanent members in the Security Council setting should not be
regarded as controlling and determinative but dialectical.
This is where the procedural or subsidiary elements of the fiduciary construct must be allowed to do their work. The role of the
fiduciary construct is to provide means and methods to measure and
assess decision-making by the Council, including the use of the veto
by its permanent members.327 When a permanent member or members use their veto in a way contrary to their fiduciary obligations,
they must account for their conduct and be exposed to the political
fallout, both for themselves as permanent members and for the
Council more broadly. There is a duty to account for their veto
through the giving of reasons and answerability to the General
Assembly. Along these lines, Liechtenstein has launched an initiative proposing that “the President of the General Assembly ...
[should] convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly to
discuss a veto cast by [a] permanent member ... within two weeks
from its casting.”328 Both the Security Council and the veto-casting
member would be invited to submit a report and/or address the
Assembly on this point.329 Such initiatives should be encouraged to
strengthen the legitimacy of the collective security framework.
While the permanent members must be held to account, there is
also a responsibility on other states to acknowledge their role in the
collective enterprise of maintaining international peace and
security.

324. Conditions of Admission of State to Membership in United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1948 I.C.J. 57, 92 (May 28) (dissenting opinion by Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, and Read,
JJ.).
325. Cf. Blätter & Williams, supra note 322, at 303-04.
326. See supra Introduction.
327. See supra notes 306-19 and accompanying text.
328. Christian Wenaweser & Sina Alavi, Innovating to Restrain the Use of the Veto in the
United Nations Security Council, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 65, 69-70 (2020).
329. Id. at 70-71.
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D. Due Process in Targeted Sanctions Decision-Making:
The Problem of Displacement
From the late 1990s, the Security Council implemented a noticeable shift in its sanctions policy, replacing its approach of blanket
sanctions against states with targeted sanctions regimes against
individuals.330 Due process was markedly absent from the Security
Council’s sanctions decision-making procedures until 2009, when
the Council (under pressure following the European Court of Justice
decision in Kadi)331 established the Office of the Ombudsperson to
hear delisting requests, albeit in only one of over a dozen sanctions
regimes.332 Critics of the office note that the Ombudsperson is not a
court and structurally lacks independence, given the Security Council can by consensus choose to override the Ombudsperson’s decision
in any case.333
Does the Council’s catalogued failures to accord due process to
individuals on sanctions lists constitute a breach of fiduciary duty?
Criddle and Fox-Decent have argued that this is “plainly offside the
prescriptions of the fiduciary model.”334 The Ombudsperson review
mechanism is said to violate the principle of nondomination on the
basis that it lacks independence.335 However, when one examines
the arguments more closely, it becomes clear that the relevant
violations are in fact described by reference to human rights law.336
This is not unintentional. Indeed, Criddle describes human rights
330. Devika Hovell, Due Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2016).
331. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-1207, I-1293-94.
For more detail, see Devika Hovell, Kadi: King-Slayer or King-Maker? The Shifting Allocation
of Decision-Making Power Between the U.N. Security Council and Courts, 79 MOD. L. REV. 147,
148 (2016).
332. S.C. Res. 1904 (Dec. 17, 2009). See generally Office of the Ombudsperson, Historical
Guide of the Ombudsperson Process Through Security Council Resolutions and Reports of the
Office of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council (June 2019), https://www.
un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/historical_guide_ombudspers
on_process_june_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JKH-ZNFL].
333. See, for example, Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Second Rep. on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, ¶¶ 14, 20-21, U.N. doc A/67/396, (Sept. 26, 2012). For a different view, see Hovell,
supra note 330, at 8.
334. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra note 121, at 316.
335. Id.
336. See id.
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as “the international community’s best effort to define collectively
the legal implications of states’ fiduciary obligations toward their
people.”337 The argument is that human rights flesh out the contents
of the principles of non-instrumentalization and nondomination
such that a “state that fails to satisfy its fiduciary duty to respect
human rights subverts its claim to govern and represent its people
as a sovereign actor.”338
This is a challenging aspect to Fox-Decent and Criddle’s theory,
and there is an appealing logic to the idea that a public authority
that violates human rights will betray the public trust. I respect this
objective of casting human rights as an imperative element of the
public trust, humane as it is. However, while there is a degree of
overlap, the fiduciary construct arguably addresses a different mischief than the variety of wrongs addressed by human rights.339
There is a danger of watering down human rights protections when
they are construed as justifiable on the basis of the public trust. It
is clear from public discourse surrounding human rights protections
of minorities, including upholding the right to free speech by those
with publicly unpalatable views, respecting due process rights of
suspected terrorists, and enabling the rights of refugees, that
respect for human rights can sometimes frustrate the public and
diminish their trust in public institutions (or indeed prevent the
government from carrying out certain decisions made for public
purposes).340 Here, recourse to fiduciary theory seems a vague and
circuitous route to achieve a result far better achieved by human
rights law, applied without the need to introduce the fiduciary
construct.

337. Evan J. Criddle, A Sacred Trust of Civilization: Fiduciary Foundations of
International Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 27, at 404,
416.
338. Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15
LEGAL THEORY 301, 310 (2009).
339. For a volume addressing the normative foundations of human rights, see Rowan Cruft,
S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo, An Overview, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 2-3 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2015).
340. Cf., e.g., Mike Berry, Inaki Garcia-Blanco & Kerry Moore, Press Coverage of the
Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries,
UNHCR 1, 4-5, 11 (Dec. 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LPZ8NHW].
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CONCLUSION
As Eyal Benvenisti describes, “[t]he law on global governance that
emerged after World War II was grounded in irrefutable trust in
international organizations and an assumption that their subjection to legal discipline and judicial review would be unnecessary and,
in fact, detrimental to their success.”341 This trust has proved to be
misplaced. In the case of the Security Council, a culture of secrecy,
selectivity, political dogmatism, and lack of accountability has
permeated the legal vacuum within which it has been permitted to
operate.342 Yet there is also a growing awareness that the loss of
public trust occasioned by this culture threatens to impact negatively on the relative strength of the Council’s authority.343
The fiduciary construct has been recognized as an effective legal
mechanism to underwrite trust in the exercise of authority. Indeed,
the construct has come to assume a metaphorical status for the role
of trust in relationships more broadly, as reflected in its propagation
by certain inventive scholars as an animating idea for public
fiduciary theory.344 The question discussed in this Article is whether
it is appropriate to extend the metaphor further to the Security
Council context. Martha Minow cautions about the danger in
metaphorical thinking obscuring our understanding of particular
concepts “both because it keeps us from focusing on aspects of a
thing that are inconsistent with the metaphor we choose, ... and
because we fail to remember that we deliberately substituted the
part for the whole, pretending that the substitution is somehow
natural and real.”345 William Faulkner’s succinct chapter in As I Lay
Dying, “My mother is a fish,” is not understood as a segue into
marine biology but as an analogy drawn by one of the characters
between his mother’s floating coffin and a fish he once caught, an
analogy that assists him in turn to understand the nature of

341. Benvenisti, supra note 166, at 9, 12.
342. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 183, at 106-09, 111.
343. See id. at 107-09.
344. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 14, at 350.
345. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 10, 44 n.165 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
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death.346 Just as we do in literature, we must be astute enough as
lawyers to distill from the metaphor what is similar while excluding
or disregarding what remains different.347 While we may accept that
the terminology of social contract tells us about the importance of
the element of consent in the legality of government enactments, we
do not insist on proof of consideration or seek to apply the Carbolic
Smoke Ball Co. case348 to extend the social contract’s reach.
To the extent this Article proposes the application of fiduciary law
and theory to the Security Council setting, I have considered it
important to make explicit both the reach and the boundaries of the
fiduciary construct in its capacity to underwrite trust. We should be
cautious not to apply the fiduciary metaphor imprecisely, either too
narrowly so as to constrain Council authority through the application of obligations that are an inappropriate fit in this sphere, or too
broadly elaborating a set of constraints that do not respect the
essential limits of the fiduciary construct. I have argued for the
importance of disaggregating two manifestations of the fiduciary
construct: fiduciary as a precept of law (which I describe in the
international setting as the contractual concept) and fiduciary as a
precept of authority (which I describe as the constitutional concept).349 These two concepts have different sources, different content,
and different consequences. Yet I have argued that at the heart of
both are the duties of nonexploitation and due performance.350 While
acknowledging certain qualifications, both in terms of its application
and impact in relation to the Security Council, my conclusion is that
both duties can play a useful role in reclaiming the element of trust
in the Security Council setting, a realm in which the Council is
appropriately seen as acting on behalf of the General Assembly to
fulfill its Charter mandate.

346. Reuben J. Ellis, Faulkner’s Totemism: Vardaman’s “Fish Assertation” and the Language Issue in As I Lay Dying, 24 J. AM. STUDS. 408, 408-09 (1990).
347. See Minow, supra note 345, at 44 n.165.
348. Carllil v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 (appeal taken from Eng.).
349. See supra Part III.A-B.
350. See supra Part III.B.3.

